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Abstract
This paper develops a conceptual framework for the analysis of legal institutions. It argues that
law is inherently incomplete and that the incompleteness of law has a profound impact on the
design of lawmaking and law enforcement institutions. When law is incomplete, residual
lawmaking powers must be allocated; and enforcement agents have to be vested with law
enforcement powers.  The optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers under
incomplete law is analyzed with a focus on the legislature, regulators and courts as possible
lawmakers, and courts as well as regulators as possible law enforcers. The timing and process of
lawmaking and law enforcement differs across these agents. Legislatures are ex ante, courts are
ex post lawmakers, regulators have combine ex ante and ex post lawmaking functions. Courts are
reactive law enforcers, while regulators are proactive law enforcers in that – unlike courts - they
can initiate enforcement procedures. We argue that the optimal allocation of residual lawmaking
and law enforcement powers is determined by the degree and nature of incompleteness of law, the
ability to standardize actions that may result in harm, and the magnitude of harm and externalities
expected from such actions. Under highly incomplete law, regulators are superior to courts when
actions can be standardized and, if allowed to proceed, may create substantial externalities.
Otherwise courts are optimal holders of lawmaking and law enforcement powers. We apply this
analytical framework to the development of financial market regulation in England since the mid
19th century, with comparative reference to developments in the United States and Germany. The
comparative evidence suggests that financial market regulators with both residual lawmaking and
proactive law enforcement powers emerged in all three jurisdictions in response to ineffective
judicial law enforcement of highly incomplete law.
JLE Classification: G3, K2, K4, N2
                                                
1 An earlier version of this paper, entitled “Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law” was presented at the
Harvard Law and Economics Seminar in April 2001. We would like to thank the participants at this
seminar, as well as participants at seminars at Columbia Law School, New York University Stern School of
Business, Vanderbilt University Law School, and Yale Law School in the spring of 2002 for helpful
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Luca Enrices, Damien Geradin, Louis Kaplow, Andrei Shleifer,
and Peter Strauss for their comments. The authors are solely responsible for any remaining errors.
3I. Introduction
This paper develops the theory of the incompleteness of law and explains the implications of
incomplete law for the allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers.2 In doing so, it
establishes a framework for analyzing the emergence and functioning of a variety of legal
institutions both within and across countries. The paper starts with the simple observation that in
today’s complex legal systems a number of different agents exercise lawmaking and law
enforcement powers. Frequently one and the same agent exercises lawmaking and law
enforcement powers, the commitment to the division of powers among legislature, executive, and
judiciary notwithstanding. As we will show below, the theory of the incompleteness of law helps
explain why lawmaking and law enforcement has proliferated beyond legislatures and courts, and
in particular, why regulators play such an important role as lawmakers and law enforcers in most
economies today. At the same time the theory also explains why in certain areas regulators are
absent. In short, we develop a theory of the optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement
powers given that law is inherently incomplete.
The incompleteness of law theory is inspired by the incompleteness of contract theory, which
was spearheaded by Oliver Hart and others in the economics literature.3 A reception of this theory
into legal analysis is only beginning, but as suggested by others,4 bears a lot of promise. The
                                                
2 The term “incomplete law” has frequently been mentioned in the literature without, however, developing
this into a broader framework to explain the processes and institutions of lawmaking and law enforcement.
Closest to our use of the word “incomplete law” is probably William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The
Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & Econ. 875 (1975). In this paper, which
addresses the puzzle of judicial independence, the authors note that “…the limits of human foresight, the
ambiguities of language, and the high cost of legislative deliberation combine to assure that most
legislation will be enacted in a seriously incomplete form, with many areas of uncertainty left to be
resolved by the courts.” (at p. 879; emphasis added). The theory presented in this paper goes a step further
and suggests that not only courts, but other agents, such as regulators, may be charged with lawmaking and
law enforcement, and attempts to identify the optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement rights.
3 See Part I, section 3 below for references.
4 See Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner et al., Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts, John M. Olin Law &
Economics Working Paper (2000) for an excellent introduction to this newly developing field. The
terminology of “incomplete contracts” has been used in the legal literature for quite a while. See only Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules,
4starting point of our theory is that not only contracts, but that law is inherently incomplete –
indeed that the incompleteness problem is more profound for law and implicates strategies for
dealing with the problem of incomplete contracts. We regard a law as complete, if all potential
harmful actions can be unambiguously specified in the law. Otherwise, a law is incomplete –
either because of gaps (the law fails to address certain actions) in the law or because of the open-
ended nature of legal provisions (the boundaries of the law are not clearly circumscribed). Some
areas of the law may be more incomplete than others. Environmental factors influence the relative
incompleteness of law. Areas that are affected by the pace of socioeconomic and/or technological
change, for example, tend to be more incomplete than areas unaffected by exogenous change. The
reason is that change constantly challenges legal solutions designed to solve “old” problems and
thus requires frequent adaptations of the law, if it is to remain effective.
Law may also be incomplete by design. Lawmakers may decide to design laws more or less
incomplete and will often due so in view of existing law enforcement institutions and their
effectiveness. Knowing that courts will step in and fill the gaps left by laws may lead lawmakers
to draft broad open-ended provisions rather than detailed ones. Conversely, if lawmaking powers
are withheld from courts, or if courts are perceived to be incapable of exercising these powers in a
meaningful fashion, lawmakers may want to write down their intentions in a more precise
manner. Yet, as we will further explain below, highly specific laws are also incomplete, because
they are bound to leave out issues that may be relevant for deciding future cases.
When law is incomplete it cannot be applied to cases without clarifying the meaning of the
law. We call the power to interpret existing law, to adapt it to changing circumstances and to
extend its application to new cases ‘residual lawmaking power’.5 Residual lawmaking powers
                                                                                                                                                
Yale L.J. 87 (1989). They treat incompleteness of problems primarily as a design issue. Contracts are
incomplete because it is too costly to write complete contracts, or they have strategic reasons to believe that
they might benefit from relatively incomplete contracts. This arguments implies that in theory it is possible
to write fully complete contracts.
5 As we will further discuss in Section 3 below, these terms are borrowed from the incompleteness of
contracts literature, which has inspired our theory of the incompleteness of law.
5may be reserved by the legislature. They may also be vested with courts, or with regulators. The
paper explores the conditions under which the allocating residual lawmaking powers to
legislatures, courts, or regulators will be optimal.
Allocating lawmaking powers alone is, however, not sufficient. In addition, law enforcement
powers need to be allocated. Even the best-designed law is useless unless it is complied with
either voluntarily, or coercively. A substantial literature has developed that explores the
conditions for effective law enforcement. At the core of this literature is the deterrence function
of punishment as stipulated by Becker6 and further developed by Stigler.7 A recent survey of this
literature is given by Polinsky and Shavell. 8 This literature explores the optimal design of laws
and punishment to achieve effective deterrence, but does not address the problem of
incompleteness of the law. In fact, this literature assume implicitly that law is complete, i.e. that it
possible to design law in such a way that it will achieve optimal deterrence. Consistent with this
assumption, enforcement by courts is at the center of the analysis.
If, however, law is incomplete as we argue in this paper, it is evident that the challenge for
law enforcement is more complex than the design of law and of optimal punishment. It requires
the design of appropriate institutional mechanisms to address the problem of ineffective
enforcement under incomplete law. Under some further conditions (such as the level of expected
harm), courts alone may not be sufficient to ensure optimal law enforcement. The reason lies in
the nature of law enforcement by courts. Courts are designed to be reactive law enforcers. They
become active only, once another party – be it state or private - has initiated legal proceedings.
The reason why courts do not initiate proceedings themselves is that this would undermine their
neutrality and impartiality. At least in countries that are committed to the rule of law, these are
                                                
6 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic  Approach , 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968)
7 George J. Stigler, The Optimal Enforcement of Laws , 78 J. Pol. Econ. 56 (1970)
8 Mitchell  Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 Journal of
Economic Literature 45 (2000).
6core values that have shaped the design and the success of courts as dispute resolvers.9 By
contrast, regulators enforce law proactively. They monitor behavior, launch investigations, and
enjoin or sanction actions on their own initiative. We suggest that proactive law enforcement by
regulators has emerged largely in response to the problem of incompleteness of the law in areas,
where substantial negative externalities rendered reactive law enforcement ineffective.
For the purpose of this paper we assume that legislatures, courts, and regulators all seek to
optimize social welfare. We ignore incentive problems, problems of regulatory capture, or
corruption, which may affect these three agents of lawmaking and law enforcement in different
ways. We recognize that these issues are of great importance, but suggest that they are of
secondary importance to the problem of incompleteness of the law. Solving the problem of
regulatory capture by, for example, abolishing regulators will not address the problem of under-
enforcement of the law that – as we argue - gave rise to the establishment of regulators in the first
place. Conversely, arguing that regulators can be more effective law enforcers than courts when
law enforcement requires costly efforts in collecting evidence,10 does not explain why we do not
see regulators in all areas of the law where the collection of information is costly.
The paper is organized as follows. In Part II we develop the theory of the incompleteness of
Law.  Section 1 explains the key ingredients of the theory and discusses the optimal allocation of
residual lawmaking powers. Section 2 analyzes law enforcement under incomplete law and
                                                
9 As Milgrom, North and Weingast show, the emergence of neutral dispute resolvers has played a crucial
role in the economic development of Europe since the late Middle Ages Paul R. Milgrom, Douglas C.
North et al., The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade: The Law Merchant, Private Judges, and the
Champagne Fairs, 2 Econ. & Pol. 1 (1990). Using a game theoretical model they show the positive impact
of courts when they are act as neutral arbiters. Relaxing this assumption and assuming that courts may take
bribes, which violates their impartiality, as negative implications for solving the information problem that
traders face when they transact with parties with whom they do not maintain a long term relation.
Comparative analysis suggests that actual or perceived lack of impartiality of judges undermines the
effectiveness of law enforcement. See, for example, Katharina Pistor, Supply and Demand for Contract
Enforcement in Russia: Courts, Arbitration, and Private Enforcement, 22 Rev. Cent. E. Eur. L. 55 (1996)
for Russia. ADD FROM VALUE OF LAW. See also Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins,
Q. J. Econ. (2001) CHECK on differences in the evolution of the court system in England and France since
the eleventh century.
10 See Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson et al., Coase vs. Coasians, 116 Quarterly Journal of Econmics 853
(2001). While the paper focuses on transition economies, it potentially has much wider applicability.
7explains the notion of regulators as proactive law enforcers as opposed to courts as reactive law
enforcers. Section 3 asks how lawmaking and law enforcement powers should be combined to
achieve optimal law enforcement within a set of constraints (rule of law, cost). Part II of the paper
places our theory within existing literatures in law and economics, including the literature on the
indeterminacy of law, the incompleteness of contracts literature and the literatures on law
enforcement and regulation. It also summarizes the analysis of leading contemporaries on the
reasons for the emergence of regulators. Part III applies this theoretical framework to the
development of financial market regulation in England since the mid nineteenth century.  Part IV
places our analysis in comparative context by summarizing major developments in the regulation
of financial markets in the U.S. and Germany. Part V draws conclusions from our analysis for the
need for and the optimal level of regulation and sketches out areas of future research.
Part II: Incompleteness of Law
1. Incompleteness of Law and the Allocation of Residual Lawmaking Powers
We regard a law as complete, if all relevant applications of the law are unambiguously
stipulated in the law and the law can be enforced literally provided that evidence is established.
This requires that the law is self-explanatory, i.e. that every addressee agrees to the meaning of
the law, and by implication, that there is no need for interpreting the law. Otherwise, a law is
incomplete, that is, some of the relevant issues are not stipulated in the law or they remain
ambiguous. An incomplete law cannot be enforced literally even when evidence is established.
Our basic premise is that law is intrinsically incomplete by way of extrapolating from the
insight that contracts are inherently incomplete.11 In fact, laws are bound to be more incomplete
than contracts, because laws serve a much larger number of addressees, are designed to cover a
8much greater variance of cases, and typically have much longer duration. The generality,
durability and predictability of the law and its equal application to individuals is not a universal
property of law. There is abundant historical and contemporary evidence of law being used
arbitrarily by those in power, changed at whim and applied discriminatorily.12 The benefits of
these properties for socioeconomic development have been stressed by Max Weber, who stated
that a rational and predictable legal system was one of the preconditions for the emergence of
capitalism. 13 This at least follows from core elements of the rule of law, in particular the
generality of law. Generality of law means that law is designed to stay, to apply to large numbers
of addressees and for longer periods of time. Given these constraints, it is impossible to design
complete law, which could clearly determine the outcome for the variance of cases that may arise
in the future.
Absent such constraints, law could be designed to be more – even though not fully –
complete. A law could be designed to apply to a specific case and to last only for a short period of
time. Such a law would closely resemble a specific contract between the state and a private party
rather than a social contract with multiple addressees. We call this “single-case-law”.  Each
single-case-law can be more complete for the particular issue it addresses than a general law.
Still, this approach has important limitations. Only the parties to the law would benefit. Others
might bargain for similar arrangements, but without certainty as to the outcome of their
                                                                                                                                                
11 For an summary of the incompleteness of contracts theory see below under section 3.
12 The old socialist doctrine regarded the Western notion that law ought to be predictable and adhere to the
principles of equality and impartiality as bourgeois fetish and of no relevance for the socialist legal system.
See William E. Butler, Soviet Law, ed. 2 (1988) pp. 30 (32) for a summary of the Soviet theory of state and
law. More general, autocratic rulers find it hardly in their interest to abide by such principles, as this
constraints their powers to rule as they wish. There is mounting evidence, however, that the lack of rule of
law has deleterious impact on the prosperity of countries. See Stephen Knack & Philip Keefer, Institutions
and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures., 7 Econ. &
Pol. 207 (1994) and Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, CX The Quarterly Journal of  Economics 681
(1995).
13 See Max Weber, General Economic History, Social Science Classics Series (1924/1981), Chapter IV at
p. []. Predictability does not mean that the outcome of a case could be clearly predicted, but that the legal
system is sufficiently stable to allow entrepreneurs to plan their activities within this framework. For an
interpretation of Weber’s notion of legality, see Randall Collins, Weber's Last Theory of Capitalism, 45
9negotiations. Single-case-laws regulate specific affairs, but do not establish positive externalities
in the form of general rules that might help others to structure their relation and serve as guidance
for future disputes. In other words, they create private, but not social benefits. 14 They are also
more susceptible to interest group pressure. Finally, because a special law must be passed for
each particular case and for every future change, single-case-law suffers from high transaction
costs.
Examples for single-case-law in recent Western legal history include the incorporation of
companies in the nineteenth century by special approval (concession) granted by the state
bureaucracy, or by special bill passed by parliament. The increasing number of incorporation bills
parliaments in the US, for example, had to enact during the period of industrialization, as well as
mounting corruption allegations surrounding the adoption of these bills, resulted in the adoption
of general incorporation acts in many states since the 1830s, in Delaware in 1883. As the number
of party-specific laws did not subside, precisely because they gave companies advantages they
could not obtain under the general law, Delaware amended its constitution in 1897 to prohibit
incorporation other than under the general law.15 Since then, changes in the law affect all
companies incorporated in Delaware and it is not in the discretion of the legislature to alter the
law only for a specific company.
The generality of law may be disputed with regard to case law. In common law countries
where courts have extensive original and residual lawmaking authority, they develop the law on
the basis of specific cases brought before them. Only those parts of the decision that are
supported by the facts are binding on other courts. Other parts of the decision are considered
dicta.16 Still, the binding parts of the ruling have legal force beyond the case at hand, and until
                                                                                                                                                
American Sociological Review 925 (1980) and David M. Trubek, Toward a Social Theory of Law: An
Essay on the Study of Law and Development, 82 The Yale Law Journal 1 (1972).
14 Shavell in The Fundamental Divergence of Social and Private Benefits of Litigation, J. Legal Stud. 575
(1997) developed this argument for the case of litigation.
15 Russel Carpenter Larcom, The Delaware Corporation, (1937) at p. []..
16 Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Methods - Cases and Materials, (1996) at p [].
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overruled, are binding on all cases that are alike. Thus, case law also exhibits the key features of
generality of law and equality before the law.
Each legal system faces the challenge of optimizing the relative completeness of different
laws and of allocating residual lawmaking powers. The two major legal systems in the world, the
common law and the civil law system, allocate residual lawmaking powers quite differently.17 In
the common law system, judges not only hold extensive residual lawmaking powers, but they are
also vested with original lawmaking powers, i.e. with the power to develop new principles of the
law.18 In civil law systems judges are said to interpret, not to make, law. This certainly limits the
courts’ original lawmaking powers. But it could be taken to mean that civil law judges do not
have residual lawmaking powers. The line between lawmaking and law interpretation is,
however, often difficult to draw. Moreover, interpretation even if narrowly construed involves an
element of residual lawmaking. It implies that the application of a law to a particular set of facts
does not follow immediately from the wording of the statute or case law. Thus, we suggest that
even in civil law countries judges exercise residual lawmaking rights, but concede that judges
usually are constrained in exercising these rights as a result of legal doctrine, the legislature’s
prerogative in lawmaking as reflected in legal design, and as a result of self-restraint that follows
from the notion that lawmaking is not a primary function of civil law courts.
The allocation of lawmaking rights in civil vs. common law countries may have important
implications for the ability of these systems to adapt to socio-economic and technological change.
When legal change can be brought about only by the legislature, a full-fledged revision of
existing law is required to achieve such change, which typically takes years to accomplish.
                                                
17 Scholars of comparative law typically distinguish several subfamilies within the civil law family, namely
the French civil law family, the German civil law family, and the Scandinavian one. See Konrad Zweigert
& Hein Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law, (1998;Rene David & John E. Brierly, Major Legal
Systems in the Word Today, (1985;Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W. Gordon et al., Comparative Legal
Traditions: Text, Material and Cases on the Civil and Common Law Traditions, with Special References to
French, German, and English, (1994).
18 There is a substantial debate, whether common law judges actually “make” law, or whether they “find”
the law based on legal principles. For our purposes this distinction is not crucial. The key point is in
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Legislatures will need to collect the relevant information to determine the necessity for change
and then follow established procedures for enacting a new law. Statutory change may accomplish
a change more far reaching than case law. Yet, any such change will again suffer from
incompleteness of law problems as lawmakers will be unable to foresee all future contingencies
and therefore cannot possibly write complete laws.
Courts receive signals about the need for legal change by way of case law brought before
them. These signals are not perfect, as there a serious selection biases in which cases will make it
to courts and through appeal process. 19 In fact, comparative analysis of the evolution of corporate
law in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century reveals that in common law jurisdictions
(England and Delaware) legislative change was more frequent than in civil law jurisdictions
(France and Germany).20 Moreover, courts can respond to these problems by adjusting existing
case law to new circumstances. As we will show in the second part of this paper, courts have
constantly adapted the rules governing disclosure and liability for misinformation in an attempt to
keep up with the realities of market developments. Not all decisions were of high quality, but nor
were they simply bad decisions that required legislative intervention. More importantly, the
evolution of case law reveals the strengths of the gradual learning process case law allows for, but
also its ultimate limits when faced with an area that is as quickly developing as financial markets.
Law can be incomplete for different reasons. It may be incomplete, because it broadly
circumscribes outcomes without identifying particular actions, or enumerating only few actions
                                                                                                                                                
common law countries it is widely recognized that judges exercise substantial lawmaking powers and that
this is one of their key functions.
19 See Martin J. Bailey & Paul H. Rubin, A Positive Theory of Legal Change, 14 International Review of
Law and Economics 467 (1994). This argument has refuted earlier theories that held that common law was
efficient. See Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the Common Law Efficient, J. Legal Stud. 51 (1977), George L. Priest,
The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, J. Legal Stud. 65 (1977). For a critique, see
Robert C. Clark, The Interdisciplinary Study of Legal Evolution, 90 Yale L.J. 1238 (1981).
20 Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law, Background paper for the World
Development Report 2002 (2000).
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(Type I incomplete law). Alternatively, law is incomplete, because it specifies the actions that
shall be prevented, but fails to capture all relevant actions (Type II incomplete law).21
A good example for Type II incomplete law is criminal statutes. They usually contain a
number of provisions all aimed at protecting property rights, but each being designed to cover a
particular action, such as theft, embezzlement, damage to property, and the like. Closer inspection
of these provisions reveals that not all possible actions that could violate property rights have
been captured by the law. This suggests that a conscious choice was made to write law that is
highly specific, even if this meant that inevitably actions that result in similar harm would be left
out. We conjecture that this choice is influenced by the commitment to the nulla poena sine lege
(no punishment without law) principle.
Most legal systems prohibit theft. Theft is usually defined as the appropriation of an asset that
is owned by another person by breaching his or her possession.22 When electricity was invented
and some people simply hooked their households up to the electricity lines instead of connecting
officially and paying their bills, the question arose, whether this constituted a theft. For the
German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht), which had to decide this issue in the late nineteenth
century, the key question was whether electricity was an “asset” (eine Sache) as defined by law. It
acquitted, because it denied the asset quality of electricity and argued that the extension of the
existing theft provision would amount to lawmaking by analogy, which would be in violation of
                                                
21 In the legal literature, incomplete laws of the first type are often called norms, incomplete laws
of the second type “rules”. For an analysis of the tradeoffs of norms and rules, see Louis Kaplow, Rules
versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992;Louis Kaplow, General Characteristics
of Rules, http//encyclo.findlaw.com/lit/9000art.html (1997). Building on this literature some authors have
proposed to use primarily “bright line rules” when legislating in emerging markets and developing
countries. See Jonathan  R. Hay, Andrei Shleifer et al., Toward a Theory of Legal Reform, 40 European
Economic Review 559 (1996), arguing that because courts in these countries tend to be weak, there should
be fairly little discretion left for law enforcers. The underlying assumption is that the lawmaker has a
choice to write more or less complete law. While this is true to some extent, our point is that no law can be
written in a way to eliminate discretion completely, because laws are inherently incomplete. Our theory
builds on the rules vs. standards literature. Its novelty is to suggest that the incompleteness of law
necessitates an allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers to different agents. We
attempt to determine the optimal allocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers from our theory.
22 Compare Section 242 of the German Criminal Code.
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the nulla poena sine lege principle.23 The legislative response was to insert a new provision in the
code that dealt specifically with appropriating energy.24 When confronted with similar cases,
English and U.S.  courts argued that the key issue was not the asset quality of whatever is
appropriated, but the fact that something can be appropriated. But the matter remained
sufficiently incomplete to bring a case to the NY Supreme Court as late as 1978.25 By that time,
New York had adopted a provision that made “theft of services” a punishable offense, which
covers actions from using public transport without pay to appropriation of energy or other
sources. This is a case where a lawmaker decided to shift from Type II to Type I incompleteness
in an attempt to capture a range of activities that had not been explicitly included in the law.26
More recently, English courts were confronted with the question, whether the case law on
abstracting electricity could be extended to convict persons who had fraudulently used telephone
lines without paying. This was denied on the grounds that the use of analogy was inappropriate.27
The theft problematic demonstrates that technological change may render previously fairly
complete law incomplete. Prior to the invention of electricity or telecommunications the concept
of theft had been well defined and was fairly complete. But electricity or telephone lines were not
assets in the traditional sense. Lawmakers and law enforcers had to decide whether the
unauthorized use of electricity or telephone lines deserved the same level of punishment. The
cases reveal that courts exercise only limited residual lawmaking powers in the area of criminal
law. The result has frequently been acquittal, even though the identified actions were widely
regarded as wrongful. This is a clear example of under-enforcement of the law. To some extent,
                                                
23 See RGStr 29, 111 and RGStr 32, 165.
24 Compare Sec. 248c StGB, which was inserted in April 1900.
25 For a summary of U.S. and English case law in this matter, see 402 N.Y.S. 2d 137. In the words of the
Supreme Court of Illinois dealing with this matter in 1937, “The true test of what is a proper subject of
larceny seems to be not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of
appropriation by another than the owner”. Cited ibid at p. 140.
26 A concern with such a provision is whether it is in conflict with the principle of “nulla poena sine lege”,
i.e. whether actions are sufficiently specified ex ante to warrant criminal sanctions. The task of judges will
have to exclude some actions from the scope of the law. I am grateful to Lance Liebman for pointing out
these developments in the law of New York State.
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this result is the price that legal systems pay for adhering to rule of law principles, which
constrain the power of the state to sanction individuals retroactively.
An example for Type I incomplete law, is tort law. General tort principles typically stipulate
that damages to property, life, and liberty gives rise to liability against the person(s) that caused
those damages. Note that no single action is defined, only the broad outcome of damages to
property. The scope of liability can be further circumscribed by requiring intent or negligence, or
imposing strict liability, but this still leaves open the form actions might take. Even when courts
can exercise extensive lawmaking rights, as in the case of tort law, courts are constrained by the
fact that they can make law only on the basis of cases that are brought before them, and for the
most part, after harm has been done.28 That is, they do not have the power to intervene and make
new rules that might prevent harm, even when events unfold under their eyes that might make
such an intervention desirable.29  When the expected harm of actions is sufficiently high, it may
therefore be superior to allocate residual lawmaking powers to an agent that may adapt rules on a
continuous basis and initiate enforcement procedures (see below). Regulators are such agents. In
contrast to legislatures, regulators do not have original lawmaking powers, but the legislature can
delegate to the regulator substantial residual lawmaking powers. Unlike courts, regulators become
active not only when an action is brought by others. Within the scope of their regulatory mandate,
they monitor activities, launch investigations, and change rules on the basis of such
investigations.  This allows them to respond to changes in the market and to keep abreast of
market developments.
The lawmaking function of regulators has been recognized in the literature before. In fact,
regulation is often equated with rulemaking rather than with enforcement, which in our theory is a
                                                                                                                                                
27 R. v. Shrinaeh Kalesusuwar (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. (S. 49). The appellate court held that it was
inappropriate to rely on the analogy of cases of fraudulently abstracting electricity in this particular case.
28 Provided that an action is brought, courts can, of course, act also before harm is done, as in preliminary
injunction proceedings.
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crucial element of regulators (see below under 2.). Shavell examines the difference between liability
and safety regulation rules for accidents.30 Liability is invoked after harms has been done, which is
consistent with our notion that courts are ex post lawmakers. As long as the harm done is less than the total
assets of the violator, liability rules enhance the level of care. By contrast, regulation determines a certain
level of care the regulator finds desirable, which is imposed on economic actors ex ante. Shavell argues that
since the regulator cannot observe the level of risk, ex ante rule making will not be optimal. Our approach
is somewhat different in that we define regulators as agents that monitor the market and adapt rules on a
continuous basis rather than strictly ex ante. This enhances their ability to respond to events that might
reveal the risk of certain transactions. Moreover, as we will further elaborate below, regulators in our
theory are not confined to lawmaking, but play a crucial role as lawmakers.
To illustrate the limits of lawmaking by legislatures and courts, and thus the need for an
alternative, consider the gradual shift of lawmaking rights from courts to regulators in stock fraud
cases. Until the mid 19th century, tort law had been developed for cases of wrongful actions or
deeds, including actions against life, property and personal integrity.31 Existing tort principles
required those who had taken actions that resulted in harm to compensate those who suffered
damages. Courts in England and elsewhere soon had to confront the question, whether the same
principles should be applied to misrepresentation of information, the most common means used to
cheat investors. They did so in principle, but even when faced with a rising number of cases that
revealed careless use of information, were reluctant to lower the threshold for liability from gross
negligence to simple negligence. They saw a fundamental difference between actions and words,
                                                                                                                                                
29 Note that Jeremy Bentham argued already in the nineteenth century that there was a need for
“devising a course of legislative acts adapted to prevent offenses”. Bentham, Theory of Legislation,
2nd edition 1871 at p. 358.
30 Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 Rand Journal of
Economics 271 (1984) and Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal
Stud. 357 (1984).
31 Note that civil law countries have not been able to define tort principles more concisely than common
law countries. Para 823 of the German Civil Code, for example reads, “ Wer vorsätzlich oder fahrlässig das
Leben, den Körper, die Gesundheit, die Freiheit, das Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen
widerrechtlich verletzt, ist dem anderen zum Ersatze des daraus entstehenden Schadens verpflichtet”
[Whoever, intentionally or negligently, damages life, body, health, freedom, or property or any other right
of a person without justification, must compensate that person for the resulting damage.”]
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and hesitated to fundamentally alter the legal principles on which tort law rested. It took an
intervention by the legislature to establish that directors could be held liable for (simple)
negligent misrepresentation.32 Still, neither courts nor the legislature were able to keep up with
the rapidly evolving financial markets and the ever new opportunities for cheating they brought
with them. This affected not only those who had been cheated and who found it difficult to get
adequate remedies. A sequence of financial scandals challenged investors’ confidence in the
market more broadly. In response, stock exchanges began to establish disclosure requirements
and to monitoring companies wishing to list on the market for compliance. In other words, stock
exchanges assumed regulatory power. While the London Stock Exchange was more reluctant
than, for example, the New York Stock Exchange,33 to invest in this type of activities, it did so
nevertheless (see Part V for details).
Contrast this with cases where damages are much more controlled, i.e. where only few
externalities arise. An example is directors’ breaching their fiduciary duty vis-à-vis shareholders.
This broadly defined legal principle (Type I incomplete law) has been used to hold directors
liable for actions that certainly with hindsight have damaged shareholder rights. It has proved to
be impossible to capture the scope of fiduciary duty in statutory law. State legislatures in the U.S.
have tried to carve out typical problem areas, such as conflict of interests as a violation of the
duty of loyalty.34 By and large, however, they have left it to courts to define the scope of fiduciary
                                                
32 This was accomplished with the enactment of the Directors’ Liability Act in 1890. On the genesis of this
act see below in Part III.
33 For a comparative treatment of the two exchanges, see R.C. Michie, The London and New York Stock
Exchanges, (1987). See also John C. Jr. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and
the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001) at pp. 34. He calls the New
York Stock Exchange a “Guardian of the Public Investor” and attributes its much more active role as
compared with the London Stock Exchange to the structure of the exchange (membership was limited) and
the resulting incentive structure for members to regulate the market; the relative small size, which
mandated selection of companies for listing; the fact that NYSE, but not London adopted a fixed brokerage
commission, which drove away lower-volume and lower-priced stock from the exchange; and past
experience that demonstrated the immediate impact of company failure on stock exchange members and –
because of its close, cartel-like structure, ultimately the exchange itself.
34 See, for example, See Delaware General Corporate Law § 144. Note, however, that the Delaware law
precludes the voidance or voidability of transactions concluded by interested directors, if their interest was
disclosed and the transaction was overall “fair” – introducing another broad concept that requires fine-
17
duties.35 Legislatures recognized that they could not possibly capture all relevant situations
without excessively constraining business activities.36 There was also never an attempt to allocate
residual lawmaking powers in this area to regulators.
Three factors can help explain this. First, the complexity of managerial activities that may
amount to a violation of fiduciary duties defies any attempt of standardization. This implies that it
is impossible for the legislature or for regulators to write Type II incomplete law that would
capture a substantial number of actions without overtly constraining managerial decision making.
Writing a Type I incomplete law instead leaves residual lawmaking powers with the courts.
Second, monitoring managerial action by an agent such as a regulator will be extremely costly.
Standardization of actions allows regulators to operate on economies of scale. Given that
standardization is impossible, regulators would need to monitor each company continuously to
decide, which actions may or may not amount to a breach of fiduciary duty. Apart from being
costly, this type of close monitoring may not be desirable as it would seriously intervene with the
private autonomy of corporations and their agents. Even courts have abstained from scrutinizing
managerial decision-making by developing the business judgment rule, which gives management
substantial discretion in decision making and allows for court revision only in exceptional cases.37
Finally, violations of fiduciary duty do not typically result in substantial externalities, i.e. in the
harm of others than the shareholders of a particular company. Obviously, systemic violations of
fiduciary duty principles by management of different companies may generate externalities, and
                                                                                                                                                
tuning by case law. For a much more detailed elaboration on conditions that lead to a conflict of interest,
see § 8.60-8.63 of the Revised Model Business Corporation Act.
35 On the peculiar evolution of corporate law in the United States, where statutory law has evolved into an
enabling law, but courts have been the guardian of fiduciary duty principles, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1618
(1989).
36 For a more detailed analysis of the optimal allocation of residual lawmaking powers to address problems
of fiduciary duty, see Katharina Pistor & Chenggang Xu, Fiduciary Duties in (Transitional) Civil Law
Jurisdictions - Lessons from the Incompleteness of Law Theory, forthcoming (2002).
37 For a comprehensive discussion of the business judgment rule compare Robert Charles Clark, Corporate
Law, (1986) pp. [];Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Corporations and Other Business Organizations, ed. 8 (2000)
pp. [].
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so may violations that are confined to a particular company when because of its size and
influence that company has substantial influence on the market. 38
To summarize, the incompleteness of law gives rise to the need to allocate residual
lawmaking powers. Legislatures, courts, and regulators can be vested with these rights. The
optimal allocation of residual lawmaking powers is determined by the possibility to standardize
actions that may result in harm, by the pace of socioeconomic and technological change, and the
cost of regulation. Residual lawmaking powers are best allocated with legislatures when
standardization is feasible and ex post rulemaking not desirable, i.e. because this would violate
fundamental principles of the rule of law. Courts should hold residual lawmaking powers when
standardization is not possible, ex post lawmaking is not constrained by rule of law concerns, and
socioeconomic change does not constantly outpace the development of case law. Regulators
should hold residual lawmaking powers when the pace of change renders legislative lawmaking
too costly and ex post lawmaking by courts too late.  It is important to realize that all of these
solutions are solutions in world of second bests, where full completeness of the law and thus full
deterrence cannot be achieved.
2. Allocating Law Enforcement Powers under Incomplete Law
Incompleteness of law requires not only that residual lawmaking powers are allocated so that
optimal lawmaking is assured, but also that law enforcement powers are vested with agents that
can best assure that the law will be effectuated. In the literature on law enforcement, courts have
always been at the center of analysis. The classic law and economics literature conjectures that
law can achieve optimal deterrence, if the level of sanction and the probability of getting caught
                                                
38 An example for the latter is the downfall of Enron and the impact this had on financial markets. See
[ADD].
19
is sufficiently high.39 In fact, under these conditions, law should be largely self-enforcing, i.e.
violations should not occur. Yet, courts play an important role in reminding potential violators
that the probability of being caught remains high and that liability will result.
When law is incomplete, law enforcement by courts alone may not be sufficient.
Incompleteness of the law means that it is unclear, whether a particular action falls within the
scope of a law and thus will result in punishment or liability. Note that incompleteness is different
from the probability of being caught. The latter refers to the question, whether evidence can be
established. The question, whether an action falls within the scope of the law precedes the
question of evidence. Incompleteness of law is also different from the issue that there might
uncertainties as to the level of punishment. Given uncertainty as to the reach of the law, parties
may not bring action even after harm has been done, much less before in an attempt to stop
actions that might result in harmful outcomes. The result is under-enforcement of the law even
when law enforcers control sufficient resources to ensure effective enforcement should a law call
for liability. The problem of under-enforcement is exacerbated by the fact that courts are designed
to enforce law reactively. They are passive and do not take action until somebody has brought an
action (including an action for a preliminary injunction, which allows enjoining actions before
harm has been done). When actions can generate substantial harm, including externalities,
reactive law enforcement typically comes too late.
The limits of reactive law enforcement are best exemplified when we assume that courts have
no residual lawmaking powers. Under this condition, courts will have to dismiss a case whenever
the law is not unambiguously specified, i.e. for which it does not offer a clear-cut solution.  It is
then up to the lawmaker to correct the situation and enact a new law. This happened in Germany
in the case of electricity theft, discussed above. In areas that are highly susceptible to
                                                
39 Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic  Approach , 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169 (1968); George J.
Stigler, The Optimal Enforcement of Laws , 78 J. Pol. Econ. 56 (1970). See also the recent summary by
Mitchell  Polinsky &Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law, 38 Journal of
Economic Literature 45 (2000).
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socioeconomic or technological change, purely reactive law enforcement cannot ensure effective
deterrence. In a changing environment new opportunities for taking actions and exploiting
opportunities evolve constantly. Many of these actions may be productive, some may be harmful.
If the law cannot distinguish between them ex ante, substantial harm may have been done by the
time the legislature intervenes and amends the law to take account of the changes. 
When courts have at least some residual lawmaking powers, they may modify existing law
when applying it to new cases. This is exactly what English courts did when they developed the
principle of “abstracting electricity” and punished offenders accordingly, or when US courts ruled
that the key question for the application of theft provisions is not the asset quality, but the ability
to appropriate. There will be fewer acquittals or dismissals with the effect that actors may be
more cautious when designing strategies aimed at circumventing the law. Thus, when courts hold
residual lawmaking powers, the deterrence effect of the law may be higher than when they don’t.
Still, the ex post lawmaking on the basis of new cases cannot undo the harm that has been done.
The constraints of ex post lawmaking and reactive law enforcement may be tolerable when
harm is controlled, i.e. when it does not create substantial negative externalities. An example is
the violation of obligations that directors owe to shareholders of the firm they manage (fiduciary
duties). In this case, harm is limited to shareholders of that particular company only, and they
have a fair chance that some of the damages to them or the corporation will be effectively
remedied ex post. In comparison, when actions create substantial externalities, i.e. when a large
number of new investors are affected by harmful actions, ex post lawmaking and reactive law
enforcement comes too late and is unlikely to remedy the harm that has been done. In this case it
will be optimal to shift from reactive law enforcement to proactive law enforcement, or to vest
regulators rather than courts with law enforcement powers.
We define a regulator as an institution that enforces law proactively, rather than reactively. A
regulator frequently is, but need not be, a state agent. A self-regulatory body, such as a stock
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exchange, can exercise similar functions as a state-regulator.40 Proactive law enforcement
includes various functions, including controlling entry, monitoring activities, initiating
investigations, enjoining actions, and administering or initiating the administration of sanctions
against violators. None of these functions can be carried out by courts, because courts are
designed to be impartial and therefore have to remain passive until actions are brought by others.
A simple example for proactive law enforcers is the police. It monitors behavior and seeks to
prevent damages by enjoining actions that are likely to cause harm. The police can stop a car even
if it is not speeding or violating other rules, for example, when the manner of driving suggests
that there could be something wrong (sometimes exact observance of the rules can raise
suspicions). This is a classic example of proactive law enforcement. The police cannot convict the
driver. This remains the task of the courts. But it can stop him, administer an alcohol test, prevent
him from continuing his way should the test be positive, and even fine him. To do this, the police
is explicitly vested with the power to investigate, collect information and enjoin actions.
The advantage regulators have over courts in enforcing the law is that they monitor behavior
on a regular basis and adjust rules accordingly. In addition, they can stop actions that appear not
to comply with existing rules. Once it is established that the action may generate harm or has
already resulted in harm, they can initiate enforcement procedures.  In contrast to courts,
regulators do not have to wait for others to take action. They are the ‘initiators’, even when the
final legal settlement is left with the courts as the ‘resolvers’.
This definition of a regulator is different from the conventional one. The economics and law
and economics literature describes regulation as state intervention,41 and thus as an alternative to
                                                
40 Self-regulatory bodies typically are more constrained in their jurisdiction than state regulators are. For
example, they may punish effectively only members of their organization and cannot reach beyond them.
However, to keep matters simple we will treat state and non-state regulators alike for the purpose of this
paper. There is a growing literature on the trade-offs between regulation and self-regulation. [ADD]. This
literature assumes a need for regulation, which our theory seeks to explain. We intend to address the
tradeoff between state regulation and self-regulation under incomplete law in future research.
41 Richard Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell Journal of Economic Management 335 (1974)
at p. 335 calls regulation “any form of state intervention”. Twenty years later, Laffont describes regulation
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market mechanisms. Regulatory activities are typically associated with rules that direct economic
behavior.42 In our definition, regulators combine continuous lawmaking rights with proactive law
enforcement powers. We regard the combination of these two function as a crucial institutional
innovation to deal with the problem of under-enforcement that results from the incompleteness of
law. Viewed in this light, regulators are not substitutes for market mechanisms, but an integral
part of highly complex and rapidly developing markets.
Regulation does not come without cost. The direct costs of regulation include the size of the
budget needed to hire monitors, investigators, file information, and launch lawsuits. 43 The indirect
costs of regulation comprise the costs market participants incur because they have to comply with
regulation, and that society incurs when regulatory lawmaking and law enforcement is sub-
optimal. A regulator can impose costs that outweigh the benefits of proactive law enforcement.
Conversely, a regulator may err by under-deterring potentially harmful actions. 44 Thus, not every
regulation is “good”, but only regulation that optimizes the cost of law enforcement as compared
with other enforcement devices.
To summarize, regulators perform a different function than courts in law enforcement. As
proactive law enforcers, regulators can enjoin actions and initiate enforcement procedures, which
is an important advantage over courts when law is incomplete. Still, even under this condition we
do not observe regulators in all areas of the law, and in fact cannot justify the establishment of
                                                                                                                                                
in an article that reviews the new regulatory literature as “the public economics face of industrial
regulation. It explores the various ways in which governments interfere with industrial activities for the
good or for the bad.”  See Jean-Jacques Laffont, The New Economics of Regulation Ten Years After, 62
Econometrica 507 (1994) at p. 507.
42 See Shavell (1984) op cit at note [].
43 See also Steven Shavell, Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. Legal Stud. 357 (1984) op
cit note [] who points out that regulators operate even when there is no harm. The same is true for courts, of
course, unless a legal system relies exclusively on ad hoc dispute settlement institutions. However, courts
may shift to different cases when there is a drop in litigation, whereas regulators are much more specialized
law enforcers.
44 On the tradeoff between monitoring and investigating and the cost implications of these regulatory
enforcement mechanisms, compare Dilip Mookerjee & I.P.L. Png, Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in
Enforcement of Law, 82 Am. Ec. Rev. 556 (1992). Using a formal model to compare the tradeoffs, they
conclude that the use of these alternative enforcement devices should be tailored to the severity of the
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regulators in all cases. The costs of proactive law enforcement by regulators can be justified only
when harmful actions are likely to create substantial negative externalities, which cannot be fully
remedied by reactive law enforcement.
Examples for areas of the law where a regulator can be justified on the above grounds include
the production and dissemination of pharmaceuticals, the construction of nuclear power plants, or
safety standards for aviation industry. The probability that harm will occur may be low, but if it
occurs, the life of many people may be at stake. The actions that may result in the harmful
outcome are difficult to specify ex ante. With respect to pharmaceuticals, for example, they may
include mistakes in basic research that led to the identification of a new substance used in the
drug, in the design or assessment of test trials, or in the production of the pharmaceutical. Only an
accumulation of indicators may suggest which actions, if left unchecked, will result in substantial
harm. These features call for monitoring and investigation.
Financial markets are another area where regulation can be justified. Cheating a couple of
shareholders will not undermine the viability of financial markets. Wide-spread stock fraud,
however, can seriously undermine investors’ confidence in capital markets and hurt the
economy.45 The history of the law governing financial markets, which we will further address in
Part IV below, demonstrates the ingenuity of market actors in developing schemes to defraud
investors in ways that time and again proved to be beyond the reach of existing law. Attempts to
                                                                                                                                                
offense. Smaller offenses should not be investigated, but only monitored. Larger offenses should be
investigated in accordance with their severity and fines should be maximized.
45 Paul Milgrom & Nancy Stokey, Information, Trade, and Common Knowledge, 26 Journal of Economic
Theory 17 (1982). On the importance of financial market regulation for sustainable market development,
compare also Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. Rev. (2000). The proposition that mandatory disclosure can help avoid externalities is highly
disputed in the legal literature. Proponents of this proposition include Lucian Bebchuk, Federalism and the
Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State Competition and the Corporation, Harvard L. Rev. 1437
(1992); John C. Coffee, Jr., SEC Deregulation: Sense and Nonsense, 214 New York Law Journal 5 (1995);
John C. Jr. Coffee, The Lessons From Securities Market Failure: Privatization, Minority Protection, and
Investor Confidence, Draft, September 1999 (1999); Merritt B. Fox, Retaining Mandatory Disclosure: Why
Issuer Choice is not Investor Empowerment, 85 VA L. Rev. 1369 (1999); opponents include Roberta
Romano, Empowering Investors: A market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 The Yale Law Journal
2359 (1998); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law,
(1991).
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deter such actions by enhancing the completeness of case or statutory law proved to be
unsuccessful, because the law constantly lagged behind new market developments, including new
methods for cheating investors. The inability of lawmakers to prevent harmful actions in the
future simply by writing better laws eventually gave way to the emergence of regulators, first in
the form of stock exchanges, later in the form of state regulators.
3. Regime Choice: Regulators vs. Courts
In section 1 above, we identified three potential holders of residual lawmaking powers:
legislatures, courts, and regulators. In section 2, we argued that when law is incomplete, reactive
law enforcement by courts may not be sufficient to ensure effective law enforcement, but
proactive enforcement is needed. In this section, we discuss how lawmaking and law enforcement
functions combine to offer different legal regimes – a classic division of power regime, a pure
court regime, or a pure regulatory regime -  and identify factors that determine the optimal regime
choice.
Recall that incomplete law can occur in two forms, Type I and Type II incomplete law. Type
I refers to broadly phrased outcome orientated “norms”, Type II depicts highly specific rules that
define actions that constitute violations of the law. Starting from a given Type of incomplete law,
the allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers is determined by the level of
expected externalities on the one hand, and the possibility to standardize actions ex ante,
continuously, or not at all, on the other. If actions are not expected to generate externalities,
reactive enforcement by the courts will be sufficient. In this case, law can be made either by
legislatures ex ante or by courts ex post. Rule of law concerns may, however, constrain the scope
of ex post lawmaking. In case there are externalities, the key issue is whether or not regulation
can be designed to be cost effective. This is the case only, if at least some actions can be
standardized, which in turn requires some experience so that lawmakers can identify actions,
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which typically result in harm. Otherwise legislatures can only circumscribe broad areas of
liability and leave the specification of actions that shall result in liability to courts.
The greatest problem of under-enforcement occurs in the case when expected externalities are
substantial, yet standardization ex ante is not feasible, at least not at the time the law is drafted,
because sufficient information about the type of actions that typically cause the harm the law
seeks to prevent is not available. A possible way out is to give regulators the discretionary power
to bring such areas under their control when sufficient evidence becomes available to warrant
regulation. An example is the U.S. Securities Act (SA) of 1933, which vests the SEC with the
powers to “make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out
the provisions of this title”.46  Such a broad mandate raises concerns about the scope of acceptable
discretionary power regulators shall exercise. We have stressed the benefits of combining
lawmaking and law enforcement powers in the hands of a regulator, and in fact, have defined
regulators as agents that combine continuous lawmaking with proactive law enforcement. The
same features that make this a powerful enforcement device raise concerns with regards to the
principle of the division of powers, which was designed to limit the powers of the state.47 These
concerns should not be treated lightly. The task for any legal system to weigh the trade-offs
between effective law enforcement and the division of power and to design mechanisms of
checks and balances that mitigate the powerful combination of lawmaking and law enforcement
rights of regulators.
Part III. Incompleteness of Law and Related Theories
In this Part we place the theory of the incompleteness of the law into the context of related
literatures, including the incompleteness of contracts, the indeterminacy of law, and theories on
                                                
46 Compare Sec. 19 SA.
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regulation. We do not attempt a comprehensive survey of these literatures, but seek only to
delineate our theory of the incompleteness of law from related theories. 48
1. Incompleteness of Contracts
The theory of incompleteness of the law is inspired by the incompleteness of contracts theory
as developed in the economics literature. The notion that contracts are incomplete is now widely
recognized.49 The concept was introduced as a critical ingredient to explain property rights and
the boundary of the firm. 50 According to the incomplete contract literature, a contract is complete
if (and only if) all relevant contingencies and corresponding control rights – such as
responsibilities of the parties for different aspects of the relation, rewards and punishments for
certain actions, etc., – are specified unambiguously. Complete contracts resolve all possible
disputes between the contractual parties ex ante.  A contract is incomplete, when some relevant
contingencies are missing, or some items are specified ambiguously. As a result, the contract is
not literally enforceable and on its own cannot resolve disputes. The central question then
becomes who has the right to decide the issues that are not specified in the contract, i.e. who
holds the residual rights. The answer to this question is that owners hold residual rights, in fact
that holding residual rights of control is the very nature of property rights. The owner of an asset
or right holds all rights that are not specified by contract and thus controls future decisions over
                                                                                                                                                
47 In fact, the emergence of regulators was accompanied by a major debate about the constitutionality of
these new agents. For a critical assessment of this debate, see Landis, The Administrative Process, (1938).
48 Since we have discussed the law enforcement literature at some length in Part II of this paper, we do not
address it in this section.
49 Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 Review of Economic Studies
(1999) and Eric Maskin & Jean A.F. Tirole, Unforeseen Contingencies and Incomplete Contracts, 66
Review of Economic Studies 83 (1999).
50 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986;Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature
of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990;Oliver Hart, Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure, 228
(1995)
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the asset. The incompleteness of contracts literature has only begun to be absorbed by legal
scholars. 51
The main difference between the theory of the incompleteness of law and the theory of the
incompleteness of contracts is the subject of inquiry. The incompleteness of contracts literature is
concerned with private contracts among economic agents and seeks to optimize the allocation of
residual rights in economic efficiency terms. Our focus of analysis is the legal system, i.e. the
social contract that binds lawmakers, law enforcers and all individuals under their jurisdiction for
a long (potentially indefinite) period of time. The different subjects of inquiry imply different
objectives. A major concern for the allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement
powers that we posited at the outset of our analysis is that in a country governed by the rule of
law, law must in principle be general and everyone is equal before the law. These principles limit
the extent to which law enforcement can be optimized by writing as complete law as might be
possible under efficiency considerations only (i.e. by writing multiple single case laws). They
also limit the scope for renegotiation, as retroactive lawmaking is limited especially in the area of
criminal law. The incompleteness of contracts theory does not face similar constraints but can
experiment more freely with the optimal allocation of residual rights of contracts and strategies to
enhance the completeness of contracts.
2. Indeterminacy of Law
Lawyers are familiar with the basic notion that neither statutory nor case law can
unambiguously predict the outcome of a particular case. They tend to associate this notion with
the concept of “legal indeterminacy”. Scholars of legal indeterminacy have long argued that it is a
fundamental feature of human predicament that we simply cannot “regulate, unambiguously and
                                                
51 For a careful analysis of the implications of the theory on the incompleteness of law for legal analysis,
compare Karen Eggleston, Eric A. Posner et al., Simplicity and Complexity in Contracts, John M. Olin Law
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in advance, some spheres of conduct by means of general standards to be used without further
official direction on particular outcomes”.52 The reason is that the world is too complex. In the
words of H.L.A. Hart, “If the world in which we live were characterized only by a finite number
of features, and these together with all the modes in which they could combine were known to us,
then provision could be made in advance for every possibility (…)” And he adds, “plainly this
world is not our world.”53 The theories of incompleteness of contract or incompleteness of law do
not have much to add to this description of the state of our world. Still, there are good reasons to
keep the concepts of legal indeterminacy and incompleteness of the law apart from each other.
Most importantly, they have different agendas and they use different analytical tools.
The indeterminacy debate has a strong normative connotation. It questions the long held
assumption that legal rules developed in case law or stipulated in statutory law can
unambiguously resolve cases. The idea that judges are subject to the law and nothing but the law
is closely associated with this notion, often described as legal formalism. The “discovery” that
law is not as firm a guide for resolving cases as legal formalists would have it, has shed doubts on
the administration of justice. Radical critiques have used the concept of legal indeterminacy to
argue that “Law is politics” and to debunk the concept of the rule of law as a myth. Since law
does not determine the outcome of a particular dispute, other factors must, including political
preferences of judges or the political cloud of the parties to the dispute.
There is a range of more nuanced uses of the concept.54 Many have rejected the radical notion
of indeterminacy and distinguish the law’s ability to determine outcome (which it cannot) from
the law’s ability to constrain outcomes (which it does). The emerging consensus appears to be
that law is neither radically indeterminate, but nor is law radically determinate. More recently the
“indeterminacy” concept has been used to explain the political economy of rule making. It has
                                                                                                                                                
& Economics Working Paper (2000).
52 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (1961) second edition 1994 at p. 128.
53 Ibid
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been suggested, for example, that the legal profession in the state of Delaware has a vested
interest in writing highly indeterminate corporate law, because this gives it a comparative
advantage over other states. Delaware competes with these states for incorporation of major
companies and they could easily copy Delaware law – as some have done – to undermine
Delaware’s dominant role. Indeterminate law, however, requires greater involvement of legal
professionals.  The specialization of the legal profession in corporate law is difficult to emulate
by other jurisdictions, but will be valued by shareholders and other ‘consumers’ of the law.55
While this may be a plausible explanation for Delaware’s comparative advantage in corporate
law, there is no attempt to develop a theory of the optimal level of indeterminacy of corporate law
or of the design of institutions, even as only a second best option, once it is acknowledged that
law is inherently indeterminate.
Our goal is to develop such a theory. In particular, we investigate possible institutional
responses to the problem of incompleteness of the law. Our focus is on the allocation of residual
lawmaking and law enforcement powers and the tradeoffs between allocating these powers to
different agents. We do not propose that a reallocation of lawmaking and law enforcement
powers would solve the incompleteness of law problem. Since law is intrinsically incomplete, this
is futile. However, we do attempt to determine, which among several second best options is
superior given certain conditions and constraints that we identify.
Our approach differs from the indeterminacy debate also in other respects. Most importantly,
our goal is to offer a positive theory about law, not to seek normative solutions. In this paper we
only seek to establish that law is incomplete and that the incompleteness of law implies that law
cannot effectively deter, but that a well designed allocation of residual lawmaking and law
enforcement powers can enhance, even if not perfect, law enforcement. While we derive some
                                                                                                                                                
54 For an excellent summary of this debate with further references, see Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy,
A Companion to Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory Dennis Patterson ed. 2 488 (1999) at pp. 489.
55 See Ehud Kamar, Costs of Departure from Formalism: Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate
Corporate Law, 66 University of Chicago Law Review 887 (1999).
30
suggestions about the ‘optimal design’ of law enforcement institutions in light of the
incompleteness of law, this is part of our analytical framework and is not meant to offer
normative solutions for lawmaking or the allocation of law enforcement powers, at least not at
this stage.
The two theories – legal indeterminacy and incompleteness of law - may lead to similar
results. Since law cannot determine outcome, proponents of the indeterminacy theory must also
acknowledge that law cannot fully deter behavior.56 Both concepts recognize that reactive law
enforcement contains an element of lawmaking, precisely because law cannot be fully specified
ex ante. Both recognize the limitations of purely “ex post facto” law enforcement. H.L.A. Hart
expounded some forty years ago that “Sometimes the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized
from the start as one in which the features of individual cases will vary so much in socially
important but unpredictable respects, that uniform rules to be applied from case to case without
further official direction cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in advance. Accordingly, to
regulate such a sphere the legislature sets up very general standards and then delegates to an
administrative, rule-making body acquainted with the varying types of case, the task of
fashioning rules adapted to their special needs.”57 Our definition of the functions of proactive
lawmaking by regulators is very similar to the functions Hart attributes to administrative rule. The
difference is that in Hart’s analysis, this insight is only one element in broader theory on the
concept of law and the function of courts. By contrast, the design of optimal enforcement
mechanisms under incomplete law is the very core of our theory.
There are also notable differences in conclusions both theories draw. We argued above that
core features of the rule of law, such as generality of law so that it can be applied to an indefinite
number of addressees, and the principle of equality before the law, imply that the law is highly
incomplete. This proposition stands in contrast certainly to the radical version of the
                                                
56 For the most part, the literature does not explicitly address this problem, presumably because it addresses
a function of law that most lawyers would regard to be over-simplistic.
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indeterminacy proposition, which holds that indeterminacy and rule of law are incompatible.58
The indeterminacy debate seeks to critique or reconcile – depending on which side of the debate
one stands - basic principles of justice and rule of law with the fact that law does not determine
outcome, but at bests constrains the choices law enforcers face. By contrast, our argument is
closer to Hayek’s proposition that writing highly specific rules may at least in the extreme violate
the principles of generality of and equality before the law and thus  is at odds with the basic
notion of the rule of law.59 But we differ also from him in that we do not take a normative stand
on whether incomplete law is good or bad. We simply assert that from our theoretical vantage
point, general rules designed to address multiple actors and to remain unchanged for long periods
of time are inherently incomplete. Given this starting point, the task for any legal system is to
allocate residual lawmaking as well as law enforcement powers in a manner that ensures optimal
law enforcement.
3. Theories on Regulation
There is a substantial literature on regulation both in economics and in law. As mentioned
earlier, economists treat regulation typically as an intervention by the state that is designed to
                                                                                                                                                
57 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (1961) (2nd edition) at p. 131.
58 Even Hart The Concept of Law, (1961) seems to subscribe to this result, as he does not disqualify it on
first principles, but argues that the indeterminacy of law is counteracted by the invention of courts that can
make authoritative judgments. “(…) the existence of a court entails the existence of secondary rules
conferring jurisdiction on a changing succession of individuals and so making their decision authoritative.”
Ibid at p. 136.
59 Hayek has argued that any attempt to write precise law undermines the impartiality of the legislatures
and is therefore inconsistent with the rule of law: “"If the state is precisely to foresee the incidence of its
actions, it means that it can leave those affected no choice. Wherever the state can exactly foresee effects
on particular people of alternative courses of action, it is also the state, which chooses between the different
ends. If we want to create new opportunities open to all, to offer chances of which people can make what
use they like, the precise results cannot be foreseen. General rules, genuine laws as distinguished from
specific orders, must therefore be intended to operate in circumstances which cannot be foreseen in detail,
and, therefore, their effect on particular ends or particular people cannot be known beforehand. It is in this
sense alone that it is at all possible for the legislator to be impartial. To be impartial means to have no
answer to a certain questions - the kind of questions, which, if we have to decide them, we decide by
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address market failures. The means to do so is typically the enactment of rules designed to direct
behavior.60 Our theory differs from this approach in that we do not treat regulation as a substitute
to, but as a key institution for the functioning of markets. The definition of regulation as any form
of state intervention does not allow for distinctions between legislatures, courts, and regulators as
lawmakers and law enforcers. By contrast, we identify structural differences in the timing and
process of lawmaking and law enforcement that distinguishes these agents and that helps explain
why under certain conditions vesting one or the other with residual lawmaking and law
enforcement powers may be superior.  An important aspect of our argument is that the functions
that regulators perform cannot be performed by courts, as this would violate their role as impartial
arbiters. In fact, if the same proactive enforcement and ex ante lawmaking rights were performed
by courts, this would turn them into regulators. 61
We are not the first to suggest that enforcement by regulators may, under certain conditions,
be an improvement over law enforcement by courts. A recent paper suggests that enforcement by
regulators may be more effective than enforcement by courts when enforcement entails the need
to invest in costly collection of evidence, because it is easier to design incentives for regulators
than for courts to optimize their law enforcement activities.62 Our theory differs also differs from
this approach. We follow Glaeser and Shleifer in arguing that regulators have a potential role in
law enforcement that is different from courts, and that may be more effective than court
                                                                                                                                                
tossing a coin. In a world where everything was precisely foreseen, the state could hardly do anything and
remain impartial." Friedrich A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (1944) p. [].
60 See our discussion of Posner and Laffont above at text accompanying footnote 41.
61 Obviously, a fully developed positive theory of regulation would have to account for the process by
which new forms of law enforcement (proactive as opposed to reactive) become law, which requires a full
account of political dynamics. Nevertheless, the fact that many countries when faced with the problem of
rapid socioeconomic change selected similar solutions does suggest that politics – which we presume to be
different across countries and serve different interest groups – cannot fully explain the emergence of
regulators.
62 Edward Glaeser, Simon Johnson et al., Coase vs. Coasians, 116 Quarterly Journal of Econmics 853
(2001). For related arguments on the importance of securities market regulation in transition economies and
emerging markets, compare Jack C. Jr. Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from
Securities Market Failure, 25 J. Corp. L. 1 (1999); Katharina Pistor, Law as a Determinant for Stockmarket
Development in Eastern Europe, Assessing the Value of Law in Transition Economies Peter Murrell 249
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enforcement. In contrast to Glaeser et al, however, we are less interested in incentive problems.
Instead, we rest our argument on the notion of the incompleteness of law. The thrust of our
argument is that even if we assume that both courts and regulators can be optimally incentivized,
there may be a need for regulators in addition to courts to ensure effective law enforcement when
law is incomplete.
Our argument differs also from the public choice literature on regulation, which was inspired
by the work of Stigler and Posner in the early 1970s.63 The emergence of regulators and the
regulatory state is explained in this literature primarily by the ability of special interest groups to
establish an agency that would protect or enhance their interests. Over the past thirty years, the
literature has moved away from the explanation as to why regulators exist, to explaining the
behavior or regulators. Meanwhile this approach has come under increasing criticism for failing
to fully account for the justification as well as the behavior of regulators. 64 In particular, recent
behavioral and psychological research, including controlled experiments, have shown that
individuals act not only in their own self interest, and this literature has questioned the basic
assumptions of the public choice literature.65
                                                                                                                                                
(2001) and Bernard Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets, 48
UCLA L. Rev. (2000).
63 Joseph Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, Bell Journal of Economics (1971); Richard Posner,
Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 Bell Journal of Economic Management 335 (1974).
64 In what might be regarded a comprehensive critique of the public choice literature, Cass Sunstein, After
the Rights Revolution: Reconceiving the Regulatory State, (1990) identifies eight ends for which regulation
may be undertaken (Ibid at pp. 48): response to market failure; public-interested redistribution of resources;
achievement of collective desires and aspirations; promotion of diverse experiences and preferences;
reduction of social subordination; the reduction of undesirable preferences, the prevention of outcomes that
may prove irreversible and harmful to future generations, and achievements of interest group transfers.
Note that some of these explanations are fully consistent with our theory, in particular the desire to prevent
outcomes that may prove irreversible. As we argued above, in these cases reactive enforcement by the
courts is not sufficient and thus a shift of law enforcement rights to proactive enforcers, such as regulators,
becomes crucial.
65 The change in the administrative law literature is reflected in a recent special issue of the Cornell Law
Review (Volume 87, No. 2, January 2002) devoted to a Symposium held at Cornell Law School, entitled
“Getting Beyond Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State”. At this symposium, the public choice
perspective was represented by Jonathan R. Macey, Cynicism and Trust in Politics and Constitutional
Theory, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 280 (2002). Most of the other papers present alternatives for understanding the
functioning of regulators. See, for example, Edward L. Rubin, Public Choice, Phenomenology, and the
Meaning of the Modern State: Keep the Bathwater, but Throw Out that Baby, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 309
(2002). For an approach that makes use of cognitive psychology, see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R.
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We share the interest in the emergence of or the justification for regulators with the early
public choice literature, as well as some of its critiques. Our explanation differs from both in our
focus on law enforcement. Moreover, while the behavior of regulators has become the focus of
much research in the public choice literature as well as among its opponents, we currently
abstract from factors that might explain behavior. Our theory does not exclude the possibility that
shifts in political bargaining power explain the timing for the establishment of regulators and the
powers allocated to them, but we suggest that the particular design features of regulators and their
functions has not been fully explained in the existing literature. Moreover, we find that regulatory
functions as defined here - proactive law enforcement and continuous lawmaking - emerged in
different countries in response to very similar events, namely the growth of stock markets and the
challenges transactions in securities posed to the existing enforcement mechanisms (see Part V of
this paper). This finding is difficult to reconcile with the prevailing public choice explanations,
which focuses almost exclusively on the United States.
Our theory of the incompleteness of law is probably closest to Goldberg’s work66 Goldberg
suggested twenty five years ago that regulation might best be understood as a device to manage
long term contracts, which create serious enforcement problems. This argument can be easily
extended to the analysis of law understood as social contract between the state and multiple
current and future addressees.
                                                                                                                                                
Farina, Cognitive Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 549 (2002). The
differences between the various approaches to analyzing agency behavior in the administrative law
literature is neatly captured in the essay by  Jerry L. Mashaw, Essay: Deconstructing Debate:
Reconstructing Law, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 682 (2002) who describes the two fractions as “idealists” and
“realists”.
66 Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 Bell Journal of Economics 426 (1976). A
similar argument is made by Priest in his analysis of the historical origins of utilities regulation. See George




Our theory is largely consistent with analytical accounts by contemporary observers of the
emergence of state regulation of financial markets. Landis, the first chairman of the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), explains the emergence of the administrative process, which
today is usually referred to as the regulatory state, in his 1938 book with the growing complexity
of social and economic relations in the process of industrialization on the one hand, and the
inadequacy of judicial law making and law enforcement under this conditions on the other.67
He views the rational for the emergence of the administrative process as the need for
“uninterrupted supervisory interest” - what we call monitoring – which he describes as
“incompatible with the demands of  judicial office”68, and uniformity in the approach to different
cases, which can be achieved by the judiciary process only through the time consuming process
of appeal to higher courts. 69 In addition, he argues that the process of litigation has left “too much
in the way of the enforcement of claims and interests to private initiative”.70 The slow process of
adjudication created “the demand for a power to initiate action”.71 This was the case in particular
in areas of substantial inequality of economic power between potential litigants. While this can be
remedied in part by shifting the prima facie burden of proof, ultimately a state agent with the
power to initiate law enforcement is required. Landis also points out that an important distinction
between the judicial process and the administrative process is the latter’s power of independent
investigation, which he deems crucial both for initiating enforcement and for the development of
adequate rules.
                                                
67 Landis (1938) quoted in note [] above.
68 Ibid at p. 33.
69 He adds to these considerations that lawmaking in some areas requires practical expertise rather than
general judicial reasoning (“there are certain fields where the making of law springs less from
generalizations and principles drawn from the majestic authority of textbooks and cases, than from a
“practical” judgment…”).
70 Ibid at p. 34
71 Ibid at p. 35.
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Landis clearly recognizes that the administrative process often combines lawmaking and law
enforcement functions that in accordance with the classic division of powers have been allocated
with different branches of the government.72 However, he points out that the type of remedies
effectuated by the administrative process differ from enforcement mechanisms imposed by
courts. Moreover, he argues that this combination was a response to the inadequacies of the
judicial process. Judges and judge made law were slow to respond to changes in the environment
and sometimes even used their lawmaking power to dislodge attempts by the legislature to
modernize the law.73 Landis points to the importance of coordination between policy-making and
enforcement when regulating the industrial enterprise. Only such a coordinated effort can ensure
effective enforcement . He also shows that the administrative process is not without checks, even
when lawmaking and law enforcement functions are combined in one agency. The most
important checks he lists include the narrow field of activity of regulators as compared to courts;
the professionalism of the regulator; the need to produce facts to sustain an order; and the
independence of administrative tribunals, which is ensured by a division of labor within the
administration; and judicial review of administrative orders.
5. Summary
The theory of the incompleteness of the law is closely related to a number of existing theories
and consistent with contemporary analysis of the emergence of financial market regulation in the
first half of the 20th century. Its novelty is that it offers a new coherent analytical framework for
                                                
72 “No one can fail to recognize that there are dangers implicit in this combination of functions in an
administrative agency”, p. 56.
73 This one statement seems to be consistent with the claim made by Glaeser and Shleifer in a recent paper
that the emergence of the regulatory state can be explained by the fact that the judiciary yielded to strong
economic interests. See Glaeser and Shleifer []. However, there is little further substantiation of this claim
in the text. In fact, Landis’ observations seem to be more consistent with our claim that incompleteness of
law rendered existing lawmaking and law enforcement mechanisms ineffective in an area as highly
susceptical to socioeconomic change and as loaded with potential negative externalities as financial market
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analyzing the design and evolution of legal systems. Incompleteness of the law is the foundation
of this analytical framework. The allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers
and the detailed analysis of how institutions differ in the way in which they use these powers are
its analytical tools. In this paper we use this framework for analyzing law enforcement, but the
implications of this theory go much further. In particular, the theory can be used to compare legal
systems, as suggested by our brief discussion of civil law vs. common law countries and to
analyze lawmaking and law enforcement in countries where the choice of legal institutions may
be more limited.
IV. The Evolution of Financial Market Regulation in England
In this part of the paper we use the development of financial market regulation in
England as a case study as an illustration for the theoretical framework that was developed in Part
I. Since financial market regulation is too broad a subject, we limit the analysis to the disclosure
regime for initial public offerings and listing on stock markets.
The choice of jurisdiction was motivated by several factors. England was not only the
first industrializing economy, but also among the first to develop a sophisticated financial market
for corporate securities. 74 Being the mother country of the common law, England offers an
excellent case for testing the effectiveness of judge made law in coping with challenges of rapid
socioeconomic and technological change that accompanied the development of financial markets.
Common law is known to evolve incrementally as new cases are brought to court. In fact, a major
part of judicial reasoning is to distinguish new cases from old ones and to determine, whether
                                                                                                                                                
regulation. We are grateful to Andrei Shleifer for pointing us to Landis’ book as an important source for
understanding the emergence of the regulatory state.
74 Arguably, the Netherlands had the first market in corporate securities after the floating of the shares of
the Dutch East Indian Company, which was founded in 1602.
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existing law extends to factually new cases. While theorists of the common law do not use the
term “incompleteness of the law”, the idea that the common law is constantly challenged by new
developments is widely acknowledged.75 As noted above, some scholars have argued that this
process is more likely to achieve efficient law than top down imposed legislated law.76 Using the
case law on misrepresentation of information as an example, we seek to explore the effectiveness
of lawmaking and law enforcement in the hands of courts in an area that was and still is highly
susceptible to socioeconomic and technological change, and that is likely to suffer from negative
externalities as a result of harmful actions.
Moreover, in light of the extensive literature on the emergence of the regulatory state in
the U.S. since the late 19th century, it seems advisable to focus on another country, where political
and economic conditions were quite different. In fact, financial market regulation in the United
Kingdom has been lauded as vastly superior to the regulatory model that was created in the U.S.
following the 1929 stock market crash.77 However, closer inspection reveals that regulatory
functions emerged in England long before the Big Bang reforms of 1986. Since the late
nineteenth century, the Companies Act incorporated many provisions on disclosure that later
became part of the securities regulations in the United States. Further, the London Stock
Exchange gradually assumed the right to screen companies that wished to list on the exchange,
and to issue disclosure rules.78 As we will explain below, these powers were not as extensive as
those exercised by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), but they existed nevertheless. In
addition, the Department of Trade and Industry as well as Company registrars carried out some
                                                
75 Compare only standard text books on legal methods, such as Jane C. Ginsburg, Legal Methods - Cases
and Materials, (1996).
76 See Rubin and Priest op cit. at [].
77 See only George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, XXVII Journal of Business 117
(1964) andGeorge J. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA, (1976). For a more
recent attack on federal regulation of financial markets, compare Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors:
A market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 The Yale Law Journal 2359 (1998).
78 For the purpose of this paper, we do not distinguish between state and non-state regulators. The reason is
that we focus our analysis on the responsibility of issuers of securities to ensure that investors receive
relevant and truthful information about the undertaking in which they are about to invest. From the
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functions that were centralized in the US style securities regulation. We find similar trends in
Germany, the third comparative case included in this study. Observing a similar shift from
reactive to proactive law enforcement and a reallocation of lawmaking powers to regulators (be
they state or private) suggests that other factors might have been at work than usually addressed
in the public choice literature.
Finally, recent literature attributes the emergence of financial market regulation to
failures in the judicial system, in particular to endemic judicial corruption in the United States in
the nineteenth century.79 While there are some allegations that English courts were less rigorous
with well-off gentlemen who came before them as directors or company promoters than with little
thieves or embezzlers,80 there is less concern with judicial failure. Since we argue that regulation
emerged in a response to the fundamental problem of incompleteness of the law, which even a
well-functioning court system could not solve, we choose a country that is less tarnished by
judicial mal-performance during this crucial period.
In the subsequent analysis, we first address the evolution of contract and tort law in
relation to misrepresentation of information in a prospectus (1). In section (2) we analyze the
legislative responses to the challenges posed by the evolving securities market. Finally, in section
3 the emergence of a regulatory framework is discussed, which added proactive law enforcement
by a regulator to the classic reactive law enforcement by courts.
1) The Incompleteness Criminal, Contract and Tort Law
                                                                                                                                                
perspective of the issuer, however, the distinction between state and non-state regulators is less important
than the function performed by these agents.
79 John C. Jr. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation
of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001). A similar argument has been advanced shortly
afterwards by Edward Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, The Rise of the Regulatory State, unpublished mimeo
(2002).
80 George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality, 1845-
1929, (1992).
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England was the first country to develop a liquid market in corporate securities. 81 The
emergence of a market for financial instruments raised the fundamental question, whether and to
what extent existing law was applicable to these transactions. Under English law, shares were
considered personal property, which could be used and transferred as any other asset. By
implication, general principles of criminal, contract, and tort law applied. The major principles of
these areas of the law had been developed over centuries. The evolving market in securities
rendered many of these principles highly incomplete as transactions in rights embodied in paper
challenged basic assumptions that had earlier determined the threshold for criminal or civil
liability, and the allocation of risks between the parties to the transaction.
The case and statutory law we discuss below was not selected to demonstrate bad
lawmaking by either courts or legislatures. While arguably courts in England could have taken
more radical decisions and developed the law further so as to prevent legislative intervention, the
decisions are firmly embedded in existing legal doctrines at the time. The point we want to make
is not that bad law existed or was made. The point is that changes in the socioeconomic
environment rendered law that was perfectly appropriate for a given set of cases highly
incomplete when applied to a new set of cases. Thus, the quality of the law we are interested in, is
its ability to deal with unforeseen future contingencies.
a) Criminal law
                                                
81 Even in this country corporate securities surpassed government bonds as the dominant paper traded on
stock exchanges only in the second half of the nineteenth century. In 1853, 70.2 percent of the securities
had been issued by the British government or other UK public bodies. In 1900 they accounted only for
13.5%. The most substantial increase came from securities issued by financial institutions (increase from
1.1% in 1853 to 6.4% in 1900) and commercial enterprises (increase from 1.8% in 1853 to 9.6% in 1900).
Railway securities made up the largest fraction of non-state securities (18.5% in 1853, 43.4% in 1900), but
the growth can be largely attributed to listings of foreign, in particular, of US railway companies. For
details, see Table 3.2 and 3.3 in Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, (1999) at pp.
88, 89.
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As other areas of the law, criminal law in England developed primarily through case law. The
first statutory law to address the scope of criminal liability of those responsible for publishing and
disseminating a prospectus was the Larceny Act of 1861.82 It established criminal liability for
directors, company managers, and others who knowingly included in the prospectus false
information that was material. 83 The act clearly requires intent, which not only proved difficult to
establish (a problem of evidence), but raised the more fundamental legal question about the
appropriate threshold of liability for the actions concerned.84 It is also noteworthy that the crime
is only a misdemeanor, not a felony. Moreover, the Act addresses only the inclusion of false
information, not the omission thereof. Case law increasingly revealed that the lack of disclosure
was at least as damaging to investors as the inclusion of false information.
Comprehensive criminal statistics are not available, but secondary sources suggest that
only relatively few criminal charges were brought successfully against key figures in the
speculative bubbles that England experienced in the nineteenth and early twentieth century.85 One
explanation is the rather high threshold criminal charges must meet in specifying the types of
actions that would be punishable.86 This is fully consistent with out theoretical analysis. Recall
that criminal law is subject to the nulla poena sine lege constraint, which constraints state power
to prosecute and punish only on the basis of a firm legal foundation. At the same time, this makes
criminal law incomplete in the sense of Type II incompleteness.
                                                
82 Larceny Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96), s. 84
83 The exact wording is: “Whosoever, being a director, manager, or public officer of any body corporate or
public company, shall make, circulate, or publish, or concur in making, circulating, or publishing, any
written statement or account which he shall know to be false in any material particular, with intent .... to
induce any person .... to entrust or advance any property to such body corporate or public company .... shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor. ....".
84 See the discussion under [] below.
85 For a detailed account, compare George Robb, White-Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud
and Business Morality, 1845-1929, (1992).
86 Another reason is the lack of capacity. In this regard it is noteworthy that England established a public
prosecutor only in the 1870s. Previously, victims of criminal acts acted as prosecutors. Compare David
Philips, Crime and Authority in Victorian England, (1977). Fraud actions were notoriously difficult to
prove. Only after WWII was an Anti-Fraud taskforce established at Scotland Yard. The Roskill Report
completed in 1986 still found fraud prevention still highly wanting. This led to the creation of the Serious
Fraud Office (SFO), which is part of the UK criminal justice system.
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Over time, the courts relaxed these principles somewhat, but only reluctantly, as
demonstrated in a finally successful criminal charge against a famous company promoter of the
1920s, Kylsant. The prospectus of a mail steam shipping company promoted by the defendant
disclosed adequate figures about the performance history of the company in question. It did not
mention, however, that in recent years business had slowed considerably and the company had
made substantial trading losses. The court considered the 1861 Larceny Act, which establishes
criminal liability only for the inclusion of wrongful information. In an appeal against the lower
court’s conviction, the court had to clarify whether it was permissible in criminal law to extend
the wording of the statute and convict under the law for omitting information from a prospectus.
The court held that although a criminal act must be “strictly construed”, a criminal conviction was
possible. It argued that criminal liability for omitting facts was covered by the wording of the
statute. Even when each statement in the prospectus was literally true, the entire prospectus could
be regarded as false, because of what it failed to state.87 This clarification came over sixty years
after the Larceny Act had been adopted.
Nevertheless, criminal convictions remained a rare event. The legislature attempted to
enhance the state’s ability to punish violators by revising criminal statutes as well as by allocating
additional resources to law enforcement agencies. In 1939, the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)
Act was adopted to address the outbreak of fraudulent share pushing in the late 1930s. The Act
was replaced in 1958 by an Act of the same name. It extends criminal liability to reckless
inclusion of wrongful information in secondary offerings and also mentions the omission of
material facts, where previously only intentional acts could be punished.88 In addition, the Act
                                                
87 Rex v. Kylsant, C.C.A. 1931. 1 K.B. [1932], 442.
   88 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act, 1958, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, 380. Art. 13 (1) (a) of the Act stipulates
that “any person who, by any statement, promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or
deceptive, or by any dishonest concealment of material facts, or by the reckless making of any statement,
promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive, induces or attempts to induce another person to
enter into or offer to enter into any agreement for, or with a view to, acquiring, disposing of, subscribing for
or underwriting securities (…) shall be guilty of an offence, and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding seven years.”
43
now imposed criminal liability on the dissemination of information concerning the issuance of
securities unless this was done by way of a prospectus that complied with the provisions of the
Companies Act – even if the information as such was correct.89
The most important recent attempt to enhance criminal law enforcement in this area was the
enactment of the fraud prevention act and the creation of a special state agency, the Serious Fraud
Office in 1988, charged with investigating and prosecuting major fraud cases. 90 The
establishment of this agency came in response to short fallings of the existing justice system to
deter and prosecute major fraud cases. Existing law was regarded as insufficient and the creation
of the SFO was also seen as a way to support the development of more sophisticated laws to deal
with cases of serious fraud. While the SFO does not exercise residual lawmaking powers, it helps
prepare acts of parliament. It also supports law enforcement activities of the prosecution.
Although it is one step removed from lawmaking and law enforcement, it thus combines
important functions that we have associated with a regulator.
b) Contract Law
Contractual claims under common law require the existence of a contractual relation between
buyer and seller. They could therefore be brought only by investors who bought securities
directly from the person (or agent) responsible for the misrepresentation of information, not by
shareholders who acquired their shares on the secondary market. Contractual relations establish
special obligations between the parties neither of them owes to others, which makes contractual
claims relatively easy to establish. At the same time, courts sought to balance the rights and
responsibilities of the contracting parties. One doctrine they developed along those lines is caveat
                                                
89 See Art. 14 Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act. See also L.C. B. Gower, Review of Investor
Protection, (1982) p. 20 footnote 27.
90 http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about/creation.asp.
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emptor (let the buyer beware). The rule dates back to the early sixteenth century.91 Under this
rule, failure to examine a good properly destroys a claim based on contract. The doctrine assumes
that both parties have equal access to information and reflects what was perceived to be a natural
allocation of responsibilities between buyer and seller with naturally conflicting interests. Trade
in financial instruments differed from trade in real assets in that it was more difficult for the buyer
to examine the good he was buying. In fact, reliance on information provided by others, including
the seller or intermediary, is the hallmark of financial market transactions. When transactions in
securities expanded, the courts therefore faced the challenge of redefining the scope of the seller’s
obligation to provide the buyer with information and the scope of the buyer’s obligation to make
use of sources of information that were readily available to him.
The most important contractual remedy is rescission, i.e. the unwinding of the contractual
relationship. Existing contract law ruled out the right to rescind a contract, if the buyer had
affirmed it after he had discovered the facts that allowed him to rescind the contract. An obvious
case is the continuous use of the good. The complex relationship between investor/shareholders
and the corporation raised new questions as to what amounted to an affirmation of contracts:
selling the shares? Advising a broker to sell them? Attending a shareholder meeting?
Finally, courts had to come to terms with the problem of balancing the rights of
shareholders and creditors in a company with limited liability. The first statutory corporate law of
England, the Companies Act of 1844 allowed for the free incorporation of companies subject
only to registration, but did not grant shareholders limited liability by law. This was accomplished
only in 1855. The implication of this change was that creditors contracted only with the
corporation, not with the shareholders and therefore could enforce their claims only against the
former, not the latter. This new arrangement affected the contractual relation between the
company and its shareholders. Should they be allowed to rescind the contract even when the
                                                
91 The formulation of this doctrine apparently goes back to Anthony Fitzherert’s Booke of Husbandrie,
1524 § 118, in which he warns the potential buyer of a horse: „If he be tamed and have been ridden upon,
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company was bankrupt with the implication that they would receive their money back before
creditors could enforce their claims?
The following analysis will discuss how courts have handled these three problem areas,
caveat emptor, affirmation of contracts, and the balancing of shareholders’ and creditors’
contractual rights.92
i) Caveat emptor
 To illustrate the incompleteness of existing contract law with respect to trade in
securities consider the following case. In 1865, Mr. Briggs acquired shares in a malt company. He
had read the prospectus, which listed the production and storage of hops and malts as the firm’s
main business activities. He was not aware, however, that the provisions of the prospectus were
inconsistent with provisions in the articles of association. The latter were accessible through the
Registrar of Companies and, indeed, the prospectus explicitly referred to this document. Mr.
Briggs consulted the articles of association only after the shares had been allotted, and discovered
a clause that permitted the directors of the company “to make advances of money upon hops and
other produce to the growers, producers, or sellers thereof, and to such other persons as they shall
think fit, and upon such security, negotiable or otherwise, as they shall deem expedient.” In other
words, beyond the production and storage activities, the company also purported to engage in
financial activities. Upon learning this, Mr. Briggs advised his broker to sell the shares and when
this was impossible, because trading in the shares had been suspended, he sought to rescind the
contract. The court argued that “the applicant for shares cannot plead ignorance of the clauses of
the articles of associations”. 93 Affirming the applicability of caveat emptor to transactions in
                                                                                                                                                
then caveat emptor.“ Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Prospekthaftung, (1985) p. 21 footnote 18.
92 The three areas are only a selection of the legal challenges transactions in securities posed to lawmakers
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93 Ex parte Briggs (1866) LR 1 Eq 483 at p. 484.
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securities, the court made it thus clear that it was the duty of the buyer to consult material readily
accessible to him. Nevertheless, it did not take a final view on this issue, because it rejected the
appeal for different reasons. 94
This ruling did not put matters to rest. The law was still incomplete, because it did not
specify, how far the buyer’s obligation to inform himself would go. In a case decided only a year
later by the House of Lords, it was held that where the prospectus was plainly false, the seller
could not defend himself by suggesting “that he might have known the truth by proper inquiry”.95
The relevant prospectus had disguised the fact that the concession for constructing a railway in
Venezuela had yet to be acquired from middlemen, and that the cost of this transaction would
consume ten percent of the capital the company was claiming to raise for the purpose of
exploration. Instead, the prospectus created the impression that the necessary concessions had
already been acquired. Under these circumstances, the buyer had every right in the words of Lord
Chelmsford to ‘retort upon his objector’, “You, at least, who have stated what is untrue, or have
concealed the truth, for the purpose of drawing me into a contract, cannot accuse me of want of
caution because I relied implicitly upon your fairness and honesty.”96
Given the information asymmetry between parties to securities transactions, the courts
qualified the caveat emptor doctrine, so that dishonest issuers could not use it as a simple defense.
The result was that now the doctrine became less rigid, creating Type I incomplete law (broad,
ambiguously defined standard). The scope of contractual remedies was enlarged, but at the cost of
greater uncertainty about the obligations buyers and sellers owed each other, creating more, rather
than less demand for clarifying litigation.
ii) Affirmation of contract
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Under contract law as it existed by mid-nineteenth century, a claim to rescind a contract
could fail, if the buyer took actions that affirmed the contract after he had learnt the facts that
supported a rescission.97 Existing law did not specify the types of actions that would be regarded
as affirmation in the context of securities trading. Courts became increasingly concerned that
buyers of securities would gamble on a happy outcome and hold the seller responsible only in
case the gamble did not work in their favor.
In Ex parte Briggs discussed above, the court suggested that by requesting a broker to sell
his shares, Briggs acted as the owner of shares, which indicated that he affirmed the contract and
thus forfeited his right to rescind it. Since at the time he had knowledge of the contents of the
articles of association and thus knew that facts that allowed him to rescind the contract, he
implicitly affirmed the contract. 98 In the same spirit, the chancery court denied a shareholder the
right to rescind a contract after he had actively supported the continuation of an investment
project despite the fact that its terms clearly differed from those in the prospectus.99 The court
explained that the shareholder had the option to remonstrate at once and require that the
prospectus be acted on, and otherwise rescind. After he had supported the deviation from the
prospectus in an attempt to salvage the investment project, he was bound by the terms of the
agreement. As a result, the company had the right to request the unpaid amount of shares he had
subscribed to.
Other actions that were deemed by the courts to amount to an affirmation of contracts
included attending shareholder meetings and voting on shareholder issues. 100 But could silence
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also be regarded as affirmation? In re Scottish Petroleum Company,101 a shareholder had
subscribed to shares and paid part of the purchase price in the belief that the directors named in
the prospectus would actually carry out their duties. When two of the directors resigned shortly
after his shares were allotted, he requested to withdraw from the shareholder register and asked
that his money be returned. The company refused and after some communication back and forth,
the issue was left unresolved. A year later, the company was liquidated and the receiver
demanded from the shareholder to pay up his unpaid capital. The court held that, in principle, the
early resignation of the directors could justify the rescission of the contract. However, the
inaction on the part of the shareholder after the company denied his request for rescission was
regarded as an affirmation. While some time to take additional action is allowed for, once a
shareholder knows all the facts, “he ought to loose no time in repudiating”. But what, if the
shareholder did not know these facts? Could he then later rescind based on fraud? In 1896, the
House of Lord argued that a shareholder who was not aware of fraud, but discovered it when the
company charged him with payment for shares he had subscribed to, could rescind. He could
even wait until the company sued him before he declared rescission. 102
The case demonstrates that affirmation of contracts developed a new meaning in the
context of the relation between shareholders and corporations. Courts decided these cases on the
basis of established legal principles. The changed law at the margin, but each new solution
eventually gave rise to new litigation, as private actors tested the limits of the law or new
developments questioned the scope its applicability.
iii) Rescission of Contract and Creditor Rights
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Where rescission was possible and no affirmative action had been taken, shareholders
could still loose their right to rescind to creditors of the company. Obviously, shareholders’
request to have their money returned or to be relieved from the obligation to pay up the full
amount they had subscribed to always put creditors potentially at risk. Yet, this was a logical
result from the recognition of the concept of limited liability, which was enshrined in the law in
1855. Creditors had claims against the corporation, not directly against shareholders. But would
this enable shareholders to rescind their contract after the firm had become insolvent, entered into
bankruptcy, or was liquidated? Courts were called upon to specify the meaning of the highly
incomplete law and to delineate the rights of shareholders from those of creditors.
In Oakes v. Turquand103 the court ruled that once the creditors proceeded to enforce their
claims against the corporation by filing for bankruptcy, shareholders had to live up to their
responsibilities. Shareholders retained their claims against the person who cheated them, but lost
their rights against the corporation. When exactly shareholders would loose their right to rescind
remained subject to further litigation. In 1879 it was established that the formal commencement
of liquidation procedures was not required, but that insolvency was sufficient. 104 The issue arose
when a shareholder commenced proceedings to rescind his contract prior to the beginning of
liquidation procedures, but only after the company had become insolvent. In the eyes of the court,
not the formal initiation of the procedure was crucial, but the fact that after a company had
become insolvent, the assumption of new liabilities was no longer an affair of the company, but
of the creditors. 105 However, in a case, where the shareholder had filed an affidavit stating his
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intention to file a counter-claim before the winding-up of the company was initiated, it did not
matter that rescission was declared formally only after the commencement of liquidation.106
iv) Summary
The basic principles of contract law date back centuries, yet the scope of their
applicability has changed over time. Differences in the nature of assets or the type of transaction
render existing law incomplete. The development of securities markets created new challenges
for contract law and questioned the allocation of risks and rights and responsibilities that had
been developed with different transactions in mind. As the cases discussed above have shown,
courts proved quite capable of adapting existing legal principles to the changing environment. But
they did not succeed in creating complete law as each solution created new questions. Once
courts had accepted that caveat emptor would not stand in the way of contractual remedies if the
defendant was fraudulent, the door had been opened for further challenges of the doctrine.
Similarly, when courts decided that only bankruptcy would stand in the way of rescission claims,
they had not decided the case of insolvency. It also became apparent that contract law did not
offer powerful remedies for buyers of securities. Liquid markets meant that at the time a buyer
securities discovered that something was wrong, the paper had passed hands several times and as
a result the current holder did not have a contractual claim against the cheater – i.e. the
corporation, its directors, or promoters. Moreover, the high turnover of companies that entered
and quickly exited the market often meant that contractual claims were worthless by the time the
fraud was discovered.107 Many claimants therefore chose to base their claims on tort, suing
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companies, their directors and promoters for deceit.
c) Tort Remedies
Unlike contractual claims, claims based on tort do not require a contractual relation
between plaintiff and defendant. Investors who relied on wrongful information could therefore
invoke liability against a broader range of actors under tort principles. The downside from the
cheated investor’s point of view is that the threshold for tort liability is higher than for contractual
claims. Tort law at the time required that the plaintiff had to prove intent or at least gross
negligence to establish liability under tort rules. More importantly from the vantage point of
incomplete law, the principles of tort law had been developed on the basis of assaults against
property, personal integrity or life. Existing principles could be easily adapted to clear cases of
embezzlement, but did not fit as well in cases of misrepresentation of information. To put simply,
the evolution of securities markets necessitated the transition from a tort regime developed for
“blue collar” type actions to those of “white collar” type ones, such as deceit.
By the mid nineteenth century, the basic requirements for a successful deceit claim can
be summarized with the formula that  “but for” the wrongful information, the other party would
not have entered into the contractual arrangement. This formula was, however, of little help for
determining how much weight would be placed on the wrongful information as the sole, primary,
or just one of many causes that led to the acquisition of shares.  Would any mistake, including
misjudgments about future developments in the prospectus give rise to liability? What was
required to establish intent of the seller: Must he have positively known that the information was
objectively false? What, if he believed that the information was true even though this belief might
have been unreasonable? And finally, would buyers on the secondary market have a claim based
on tort, if they had bought securities relying on the prospectus that had been disseminated for the
initial public offering?
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 Tort law as it existed prior to the development of securities markets did not offer clear-
cut answers to most of these questions and was thus highly incomplete.
i) Misrepresentation of Information
A prospectus was the instrument used by companies and their promoters to attract
investors. As such it was used as much as a document that contained information about the
investment project as a tool for advertising. Since 1844, companies wishing to issue shares to the
public were obliged to publish a prospectus, but the law was initially silent on the contents of this
document.
In 1867, a shareholder launched a lawsuit against the company and its directors for
compensation claiming that he had been misled by a provision in the prospectus stating that the
directors and their friends had acquired large proportions of shares in the company. In fact, none
of them had taken a substantial stake.108 The shareholder argued that he had relied on this
statement when subscribing to shares in the company, which meanwhile had been liquidated. An
important question in this case was, whether the information about the stakes held by directors
and their friend was material for the transaction. The court stated that it was, without, however,
giving much guidance as to how to discriminate between information that was material and
information that was not. Obviously, materiality is a highly incomplete concept, the context of
which can hardly be determined absent a detailed knowledge of the specifics of a case. This
implied that residual lawmaking powers were best allocated to an agent – such as a court –
capable of exercising residual lawmaking powers after the fact.
In another case from the same year, the question arose, whether the omission of
information could constitute deceit. The company in question had failed to disclose a contract that
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transferred a huge liability to it from the company whose legal successor it was.109 While the
court had no problem acknowledging that the omission of material fact could amount to a
misrepresentation of information, it denied liability in this case. It argued that statutory provisions
on prospectus disclosure did not include an obligation to disclose contracts. In response to this
decision, the CA was amended and a provision was inserted that required that a prospectus
inviting the subscription of shares “shall specify the Dates and the Names of the Parties to any
Contract entered into by the Company, or the Promoters, Directors or Trustees thereof (…) and
any Prospectus or Notice not specifying the same shall be deemed fraudulent…”.110 The
provision, however, had relatively little effect. Listing all contracts proved to be more confusing
than illuminating to investors and certainly did not ensure that they would spot those contracts
that were potentially harmful to them. Moreover, listing the dates and names of the parties to the
contracts did not reveal their contents. 111 A more comprehensive regulation of items that needed
to be disclosed in a prospectus can be found in the revised CA of 1900.112 The law still required
that contracts were listed, but excluded contracts carried out in the ordinary course of business or
those concluded more than three years prior to the publication of the prospectus. 113 Moreover,
companies were required to state a place and time where these contracts could be examined.
These revisions reflect attempts by lawmakers to specify disclosure requirements and thereby
enhance the completeness of law regulating misrepresentation of information. They also
demonstrate that lawmakers went through an extensive learning process as they proved to be
incapable of foreseeing future developments each time they changed the law in response to
evolving case law, which revealed the continuing incompleteness of the law. By the time the CA
was revised in 1928 (consolidated in 1929), a detailed schedule listing the items that needed to be
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disclosed was included in the law.114 In sum, by the late 1920s a comprehensive system of
extensive ex ante disclosure rules, stipulated in the Companies Act, combined with reactive
enforcement by the courts had been established.
Not every misstatement gave rise to an action under existing case law, but only those
designed to induce investors to buy. The difficulty in determining causality is illustrated by
another case. The prospectus of a company invited subscriptions for debentures. It stated that the
money was intended for alterations in the buildings of the company, to purchase horses and vans,
and to develop the trade of the company, whereas in fact, the money was intended to cover
existing liabilities. The court held that this statement induced investors to believe that the
debentures would be a charge on the property, and since this was in fact not the case, held the
directors to be liable.115 The court used this case to summarize the major elements of an action
based on deceit. First, the prospectus must include not only “a mere statement of possibility, or of
a contingency, or of an intention as to what might occur according to the person who is making
the statement, but there must be something which amounts in the opinion of the Judge or jury (…)
to a statement of a fact as existing which is not in truth existing.”116 The rather ambiguous
phrasing demonstrates how difficult it was for judges to draw the line between facts and opinion.
Second, the statement must have been made fraudulently. Fraudulent action according to the
court does not require the willful telling of a lie. It is sufficient that a person who makes factual
statements “recklessly, and so to speak, in a gambling spirit” willfully abstains from making
additional inquiries and thereby endorses a statement without which investors would not have
parted with their money.
This definition of fraudulent behavior is quite narrow. By requiring recklessness the court
implied that there was no liability for negligent misstatements. It is in this spirit of earlier case
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law that the landmark case Derry v. Peek, decided in 1889,117 has to be assessed. The prospectus
of a railway company stated that approval by the relevant state authorities had been granted to
convert an animal powered track into a steam powered one.118 In fact, approval had been granted
only for parts of the track. After the company was wound up, the directors were sued for
compensation by shareholders who had lost their money. The House of Lord confirmed that the
statement in the prospectus was objectively incorrect. But it relieved the directors – “five men of
good character and conduct” - of liability, because they honestly believed in the correctness of
their statement. Without proof of fraud – and the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff – an action
of deceit could not be maintained. The House of Lords reviewed earlier case law attempting to
discern general principles of tort law. It criticized the attempt to do justice in individual cases
rather than sticking to principles of established law. “It might, perhaps, be desirable to enact that
in prospectuses of public companies there should be a warranty of the truth of all statements”,119
but existing law did not include such a provision. Essentially the message was that it was not for
the courts to fill this gap and write a more complete law, but for the legislature to do so.
Applying our framework of the incompleteness of law, by clearly stating that negligent
misrepresentation was not sufficient for establishing fraud, Derry v. Peek specified – and thereby
narrowed - the scope of actions that could give rise to liability. The law as stated in this decision
required a high subjective threshold of liability and did not merely circumscribe areas of outcome
that could result in liability. The rational, according to the court, was to avoid discouraging risk-
averse people to engage in financial market activities (“the objection is (…) to the danger of
driving respectable and responsible men from being promoters, and of substituting for them those
who are neither”).
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The legislature responded to the court’s quest for legislative intervention, if a lowering of
the threshold for liability was desired by enacting the Directors’ Liability Act (DLA) only a year
after Derry v. Peek had been decided. Under this Act, directors and company promoters can be
held liable for negligent misrepresentation of information.120 The Act stipulates that any untrue
statement in the prospectus or other notice concerning the issuance of shares gives rise to liability,
unless those responsible for the statement can prove that they had “reasonable ground to believe,
and did up to the time of the allotment of the shares, debentures, or debenture stock, as the case
may be, believe, that the statement was true”. In effect, the law lowered the threshold for liability
by shifting the burden of proof for showing that the defendant had grounds to belief that the
statement was true. Absent such proof, misrepresentation that results in damages gives rise to
liability. Had the Act been adopted prior to Derry v. Peek, there is little doubt that the directors
would have had to pay compensation to shareholders. The threshold for liability was lowered
further with the adoption of the Misrepresentation Act in 1967.121 This Act does not specifically
target securities, but deals more generally with misrepresentation of information. Under its
provisions, even innocent misrepresentation can lead to liability, unless the offender demonstrates
that he reasonably believed in the truthfulness of the information. In terms of our conceptual
framework, the DLA and later the Misrepresentation Act shifted the incompleteness problem
from a Type II to a Type I problem. It thereby signaled to courts that the scope of their residual
lawmaking powers was more extensive than they had previously assumed and included cases,
which they had dismissed earlier.
Outside the area of securities transactions, however, the principles of fraud law laid down
in Derry v. Peek remained applicable. Only in 1963 did the House of Lords reduce the threshold
for liability by stating that negligence could give rise to liability for misrepresentation of
                                                
120 This was accomplished with the passage of the Directors’ Liability Act in 1890..
121 UK ST 1967 c. 7.
57
information. While the case was ultimately dismissed,122 it gave the House of Lord the
opportunity to revisit Derry v. Peek and related cases and restate the conditions for negligent
misrepresentation. The Lords argued that in light of case law after Derry v. Peek decision, “it
must now be taken that Derry v. Peek did not establish any universal rule that in the absence of
contract an innocent but negligent misrepresentation cannot give rise to an action”.123  At the time
Derry v. Peek was decided courts hesitated to extend the same standards of conduct to words that
existed for deeds. However, this attitude had changed in the meantime. It was now widely
accepted that words, i.e. information or advice, could give rise to liability for negligent conduct.
The Lords were careful to point out that liability for negligence required a special relation
between the parties. But they broadened the type of relations that could meet these conditions. In
particular, they explained that a special relation need not be an implied or express contract, nor is
a special relation confided to fiduciary duties. Rather it includes “all those relationships where it
is plain that the party seeking information or advice was trusting the other to exercise such a
degree of care as the circumstances required, where it was reasonable for him to do that, and
where the other give the information or advice when he knew or ought to have known that the
inquirer was relying on him”.124 This time the courts assumed greater residual lawmaking powers
even without further instructions by the legislature.
ii) Liability to Whom?
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Hedley v. Byrne addresses an issue that had been repeatedly litigated over the years,
namely to whom directors, company promoters and others responsible for the contents of the
prospectus would be liable.  As the above examples have shown, the information included in or
omitted from a prospectus was crucial for establishing liability of those responsible for the
prospectus. Clearly, a contractual relation with the acquirer of shares was not required for actions
based on tort. This, however, did not mean that anyone who relied on the prospectus would have
a claim. In order to establish liability they required that “there must be something to connect the
directors making the representation with the party complaining that he has been deceived and
injured by it.”125 In the case at hand, the plaintiff had acquired shares not directly from the
company, but on the secondary market. The court argued that the prospectus was issued for the
initial public offering. Absent any direct communication with secondary buyers, the directors
were not liable to those who acquired shares on the secondary market.
This left secondary buyers for the most part without a real chance to recover their losses,
as their immediate seller was not the one who had created or disseminated the wrongful
information. It allowed issuers of shares to develop schemes by which they would target
secondary buyers with a prospectus or other information without being held liable for wrongful
information contained therein. Courts were soon confronted with such schemes, as their previous
case law had virtually opened the door for designing strategies to circumvent Type II incomplete
law.
Father and son set up a company to explore gold-bearing reef in Transvaal. Investors
were invited to buy shares. The prospectus included information on the yield of gold from a ton
of quartz, which was objectively wrong. The plaintiff did not buy shares upon receiving the
prospectus. However, a few weeks later, a major newspaper carried an article with the headline
“A big jump in Sutherland Reefs” alleging that there had been a very rich discovery of gold. The
plaintiff now bought shares on the secondary market, basing his decision on the prospectus –
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which he had kept – and the good news reported, only to find out later that the son had initiated
the newspaper article and that it was part of a fraudulent scheme designed by father and son. The
court distinguished this case from Peek v. Gurney by arguing that the publication of the
prospectus and the launching of the newspaper article was part of a comprehensive scheme
designed to induce those that had earlier read the prospectus to buy. It therefore held in favor of
the investor. The definition of what amounted to a comprehensive scheme that would extend
liability of those responsible for the contents of the prospectus to buyers on the secondary market,
however, was left to future case law. Once again, case law rendered existing principles more
rather than less complete, establishing only some broad guidelines to delineate the scope of
liability.
Changes in financial practice over time questioned the principle that the prospectus was
addressed only at initial purchasers. In 1996, a case was brought by an investor who had acquired
securities of an unlisted company both in the initial public offering and subsequently - a much
larger amount - on the secondary market. 126 For both investment decisions he had relied on the
information stated in the prospectus, which proved to be incorrect. The defendant argued that he
could not be held liable for the share acquisitions on the secondary market. Yet, the court held
with the plaintiff arguing that commercial practice had changed substantially over the years. It
argued that the purpose of a prospectus today is not merely to induce investors to become placees
during the initial offering, but also to induce the public to make after-market purchase. In light of
this changed practice, the relation between the issuer and the secondary buyer revealed sufficient
proximity to establish liability. The decision acknowledges the principle that there must be a
special relation between plaintiff and defendant in a tort action based on deceit, but greatly
expands the scope of relations that fell into this category.
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iii) Summary
Until well into the nineteenth century, the major realm for tort actions were deeds
committed against persons or assets. With the development of financial markets words achieved
an importance that necessitated a reassessment of the type of actions that could give rise to tort
liability. Courts struggled with balancing the interests of investors in effective legal protection
against the need to limit the scope of liability in order not to suffocate markets. They also were
careful to guard well-established legal principles of tort law against a quick overhaul in response
to only one segment of the market (securities transactions). These multiple objectives led only in
few cases to the development of clearer, more complete, case law. More often than not, courts
extended existing principles to capture the new cases, thereby blurring the lines and creating more
incomplete law capable of capturing many different actions. Examples include the
acknowledgment that words could weigh as heavily as deeds, the extension of the scope of
liability to claimants that had not acquired securities in the initial offering but only on the
secondary market, and the lowering of the threshold for liability from gross negligence to simple
negligence. This strategy had to increase uncertainty about what actions would lead to liability
and thus undermined the deterrence effect of the law. An exception to this rule is Derry v. Peek.
In this case, the court rejected the idea of holding directors liable for negligent misconduct, but
referred such a decision to the legislature. The legislature indeed intervened, writing a law that
was substantially broader than existing case law and as such more incomplete.
The case law we discussed was not erroneous, or “bad” law. In each case, courts faced
the tradeoff of sticking to well established legal principles and changing them to fit the needs of
the new type of cases before them. Given the limited information they had about the nature of
market transactions at the time, their decisions can well be justified. Had courts been more
responsive to changes in the market, this may have made legislative intervention not necessary on
some occasions. However, we are doubtful that this would have been sufficient to ensure
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effective law enforcement and thereby prevent the growing need for a proactive law enforcer –
the regulator.
2) The Emergence of a Regulator
In the above sections we have shown that neither case law nor statutory law can offer
fully satisfactory solutions for an area of the law that not only is subject to considerable change
over time and as a result remains highly incomplete despite all efforts to readjust it, but where
harmful actions can produce substantial negative externalities. This section explores the
emergence of regulatory functions in England. As noted at the outset, we do not emphasize the
nature of the regulator, i.e. whether it is private (i.e. a stock exchange), or state. We are mainly
interested in regulatory functions, including residual lawmaking and proactive law enforcement,
which in England has been carried out by both private and state institutions. The major stock
exchange in England, the London Stock Exchange, increasingly assumed regulatory functions. In
addition, the Department of Trade and Industry was vested with regulatory powers by the
legislature. Recent changes have consolidated regulatory functions first in the Securities and
Investment Board (SIB) and subsequently in the Financial Services Authority (FSA), which now
regulates, among others, the issuance of shares to the public.
Evidence for the stock exchange assuming regulatory functions over issuers of securities
is available as early as 1827.  The Minutes of the – then - foreign stock exchange 127 stated that the
exchange’s committee in charge of admitting securities had refused the admission of securities by
a foreign state on the grounds that it was in default on previous obligations. 128 The case
demonstrates the exchange’s willingness and capacity to stop actions – the issuance of securities
to the public – that was likely to result in harmful outcome. The incident, however, remained an
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isolated event. General rules for the admittance of securities were not established for some time.
Securities were admitted on an ad hoc bases, primarily with consideration to the expected
liquidity of the shares and thus to its profitability for members of the exchange.129
It took some time for the LSE to realize that it had to play a role in protecting not only the
interests of the exchange and its members, but of the broader investor community – in fact, that
these objectives were linked.130 The crucial role of the exchange in protecting investor interests in
England was underlined by the fact that public offerings were made through the exchange. The
two acts – issuance of shares and listing them on an exchange – were conducted as one,
subjecting virtually all publicly traded companies to the rules of the exchange.131 It is therefore
not surprising that stock exchanges were regularly blamed for stock market scandals. 132 It also
became increasingly clear that the quality of the securities traded affected the business of the
exchange and its members.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the LSE developed some screening device,
primarily in the form of disclosure requirements. These requirements were low by today’s
                                                                                                                                                
128 Victor E. Morgan & W. A. Thomas, The London Stock Exchange - Its History and Functions, (1962) p.
152.
129 Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, (1999) p. [].
130 As discussed by R.C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges, (1987) and more recently by
John C. Jr. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in teh Separation of
Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001), the LSE was much less proactive than the NYSE in
developing into a regulatory agent by exercising proactive law enforcement and ex ante lawmaking powers.
Coffee relates these differences to the structure of the exchanges, rules on membership and the competition
they faced in their respective markets.
131 This practice is in marked contrast to the practice in continental Europe and in the U.S. In continental
European countries, listing is separate from the public issuance of shares. In fact, France and Germany
require that shares are place before the company can be registered – although it is of course possible to
place the shares among a smaller circle of shareholders and disseminate them more widely through a
subsequent increase in capital and secondary offering, or for the original shareholders to sell them after the
company has been established. The major difference between the U.S. and England is that in the U.S. many
companies are traded over the counter rather than on an official exchange. For an analysis of the
differences in issuance between continental Europe and the U.S., compare Friedrich Kessler, The American
Securities Act and Its Foreign Counterparts: A Comparative Study, 44 Yale L.J. 1133 (1935) at p. 1136.
For a comparison between the law governing initial public offerings in the U.S. and England after the
adoption of the Securities and Exchange Act in the U.S., see John Hanna & Edgar Turlington, The
Securities Act of 1933, 7 S. Cal. L. Rev. 18 (1933).
132 The attitudes of the public at large about stock exchanges in mid-nineteenth century England are well
captured in Stuart Banner, Anglo-American Securities Regulation- Cultural and Political Roots, 1690-
1860, ). For a critical review of this book, see Mahoney [ADD].
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standards, but exceeded the requirements of existing company law at the time. The rules required
the submission of a copy of the prospectus and a statutory declaration stating the amount allotted
to the general public, the amount paid up, and a confirmation that the securities were ready to be
issued. In the case of new companies a statement of capital and the nominal value of shares had to
be submitted.133 Only companies that complied with them would be quoted on the exchange.
Initially, the exchange did not have much capacity to engage in continuous monitoring.
However, it revisited its law enforcement role in the 1930s. By that time, the market for domestic
securities had become the exchange’s core market and by 1928/29, statutory law had surpassed
the exchange’s disclosure requirements – effectively imposing its own regime on the otherwise
largely autonomous exchange.134 Nevertheless, investor confidence was falling in the wake of
wide spread share-pushing schemes in the early 1930s, which the law had not been able to
prevent. The LSE came under increasing pressure to either improve its regulatory regime or face
more extensive state intervention.135 The LSE reacted by imposing more stringent disclosure
requirements and by enhancing its capacity to screen the information that was submitted. That
this indeed amounted to an improvement of the exchange’s regulatory standing was recognized in
the 1948 revision of the Companies Act, which established the most extensive legal disclosure
requirements under English law. Notably, however, it exempted companies who had made
adequate disclosure under the exchange’s rules, a clear indication that the lawmaker was satisfied
with the exchange’s regulatory activities.
                                                
133 Victor E. Morgan &W. A. Thomas, The London Stock Exchange - Its History and Functions, (1962) at
p. 152, 153. By contrast, Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, (1999) argues that the
LSE did not assume this type of powers before the end of World War I, when state pressure became an
important factor in inducing the exchange to assume regulatory powers on its own rather than have to
accept state regulation.
134 The relevant law was the Prevention of Fraud (Investments) Act of 1939, which, however, went into
force only in 1944.
135 Ranald C. Michie, The London Stock Exchange: A History, (1999) p….
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After 1948, the LSE further extended its role as regulator of companies listed on the
exchange. It now required audited financial statements. 136 In addition, since 1954 the exchange
required the disclosure of directors’ remuneration and since 1965 of semi-annual reports. To
ensure correctness of the information submitted, the exchange relied extensively on the standards
of the issuing house, sponsoring broker and the professional auditing bodies. 137 However, through
its own Quotation’s Department, the LSE reviewed the information submitted and on this basis
approved - or disapproved - the quotation of the securities. This is clearly a proactive law
enforcement function. The benchmark for the Quotations Department to this day is not simply a
list of detailed items, but a broad – in our terms highly incomplete – rule that requires companies
to submit all information necessary for investors to make an informed judgment.138 The exchange
thereby reserves the right to tailor the information it requests from specific companies. The LSE
has continuously changed its disclosure requirements over the years, which is in marked contrast
to the statutory legal framework, which hardly changed after 1948.139
The only competitor to the exchange’s role as regulator of issuers prior to the Big Bang
reforms of 1986 was the Department of Trade (DT) (later Department of Trade and Industry,
DTI). The 1948 CA explicitly allocated to the DT the power to instigate investigations, request
books and information from corporate directors, and bring proceedings in the name and on behalf
of shareholders. 140 The DT had the power to adapt the disclosure requirements stipulated in the
law, i.e. to exercise residual lawmaking powers over these issues.  However, this came with
important strings attached, namely that these regulations could not “render more onerous the
                                                
136 Initially, financial statements for the past ten years had to be disclosed. In 1973 this was reduced to five
years. See George J. Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA, (1976) p. 27.
Today, three audited financial statements for a period of only three years is sufficient.
137 For a review of the self-regulatory framework and its limits, see L.C. B. Gower, Review of Investor
Protection, (1982) pp. 32.
138 The Admission and Disclosure Standards of the LSE as of May 2001 include a provision that states that
issuers must comply with all provisions set forth in the “Standards” of the exchange. However, in addition,
the exchange “may make additions to, dispense with or modify the application of Standards either
unconditionally or subject to conditions) in such cases and by reference to such circumstances as it
considers appropriate.” Compare 4.2. of the Admission and Disclosure standards.
139 For a critique, compare L.C. B. Gower, Review of Investor Protection, (1982) at p. [].
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requirements” stipulated in the law.141 This provision substantially restricted the DT’s residual
lawmaking powers. Perhaps not surprisingly in light of these constraints, the DTI did not develop
into an active regulator. It did not publish detailed rules and regulations regarding disclosure
requirements, nor did it routinely examine reports that companies submitted. The only cases when
the DT would take action were cases “when fraud or misfeasance is in question and damage has
been caused”.142 In other words, the DT adopted a passive and primarily reactive enforcement
policy even though the law had allowed it to play a more proactive enforcement role.143
The Big Bang reforms of 1986 constituted a major overhaul of the system of financial market
regulation in the U.K.144 Nevertheless, the exchange’s jurisdiction over newly issued shares to the
public was not fundamentally altered. Part IV of the Financial Services Act (FSAct) of 1986 Act
on “official listing of securities” explicitly designates the Council of the Stock Exchange as the
“competent authority” for this part of the Act. 145 Its jurisdiction extended not only to securities
traded on the official exchange, but also to securities admitted to alternative trading systems and
those that were to be placed on markets of other EU member states.146 The only securities beyond
its reach were unlisted securities. 147
                                                                                                                                                
140 See §§ 431-35 1985 CA.
141 Quote section
142 Direct quote from the report by the Jenkins Committee of 1962 in George J. Benston, Corporate
Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA, (1976) p. 23.
143 In part, this may have been the result of limited capacity at the DTI. For a comprehensive assessment of
its role in proactive law enforcement of fraud cases, see the Report by the Roskill Committee. [ADD]
144 Add references
145 Sec 142 (6) FSA 1986.
146 The latter was accomplished by the incorporation of the EU Prospectus Directive (89/298, 1989 OJL
124 (May 5, 1989)) into English law. Since England had only a small over the counter trade and issuance of
shares and listing were usually accomplished in one step, it lacked a “competent” authority for stocks not
listed in England. For details on the realization of the directive in England, compare Vanessa Edwards, EC
Company Law, (1999) pp. pp. 266, p. 275; Simon Gleenson & Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Public Offer of
Securities in the United Kingdom, 27 Denver Journal of International Law and Policy 359 (1999) pp. 371-
376.
147 EU Prospectus Directive 89/298, 1989 OJL 124 (May 5, 1989). For details on the realization of the
directive in England, compare Vanessa Edwards, EC Company Law, (1999) pp. pp. 266, p. 275; Simon
Gleenson &Harold S. Bloomenthal, The Public Offer of Securities in the United Kingdom, 27 Denver
Journal of International Law and Policy 359 (1999) pp. 371-376.
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To be sure, the fact that the FSAct explicitly delegated regulatory functions to the stock
exchange marked a change in the history of financial market regulation. Whereas previously the
stock exchange exercised rule making autonomously, it now carried out this function on behalf of
and under the supervision of the state regulator. The state’s role was further strengthened with the
adoption of the Financial Services and Market Act (FSMA) in 2000. The new law takes away
much of the power that under the 1986 law had been delegated to the exchange. From now on,
not the exchange, but a state agency, the Financial Services Authority (FSA) defines listing
standards and approves the issuance of shares.148 The shift from self-regulation to state regulation
has many causes, of which the effectiveness of the LSE as lawmaker and law enforcer is only
one. We do not seek to explain this shift with our theoretical framework, but leave a closer
investigation of the pros and cons of self- and state-regulation to future work.
The history of financial market regulation in England exemplifies the growing demand for
residual lawmaking and law enforcement in ways that legislatures and courts could not
accomplish. Flexible adjustment of entry requirements were crucial in order to keep up with
market development at home and abroad. While the statutory lawmaker made some remarkable
progress in enhancing disclosure rules in 1928/29 and 1948 in particular, for the next decades the
legislature again fell behind market developments and left the field to the exchange. With regards
to law enforcement, it became apparent already in the nineteenth century that exclusive law
enforcement by courts was insufficient. The pace of market development and the amount of
damages caused by harmful actions not only to parties of the dispute, but to investors at large, and
the reputation of financial markets evidenced serious underenforcement problems. The LSE may
have assumed more extensive regulatory functions only reluctantly. In fact, it is likely that it
would have further delayed this process had not the government threatened with legislative
intervention, which the exchange preempted by developing its own regulatory capacity. The main
point, however, is that regulatory functions as we define them – proactive law enforcement and
                                                
148 Sec. 79 (1) (a) FSMA.
67
ex ante lawmaking – were taken up by the exchange in response to the problem of under-
deterrence of existing law and thus wide spread violation of investors’ rights.
V. Incompleteness of the Law in Comparative Perspective
England is not the only country that struggled with the problem of law enforcement in an area
that because of its constant change is prone to render laws highly incomplete. Other countries
faced similar problems. A detailed comparison of responses to the problem of incompleteness of
financial market law would go beyond the scope of this paper. A brief summary of the experience
in the United States and Germany, however, will demonstrate first, that the demand for regulatory
functions (proactive law enforcement combined with flexible lawmaking) was not limited to a
particular jurisdiction, and second, that misallocation of lawmaking and law enforcement powers
may influence the development of financial markets in the long term.
1. United States
The general legal provisions to deal with misrepresentation of information in the United
States were similar to those found in the UK prior to the Director’s Liability Act of 1890. As in
the UK, case law increasingly revealed the limitations of these principles in ensuring effective
law enforcement in financial markets where asymmetry of information was rampant and rapid
economic change implied high levels of incompleteness of the law.
Nevertheless, courts did not feel compelled to develop principles that would mimic English
statutory law. Although the “citadel of privity of contracts” had been eroded to some extent by
the late 1920s, American courts refused to hold directors, company promoters, or accountants
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liable for negligent misrepresentation of information.149 In fact, they extensively quoted Derry vs.
Peek, the decision that had triggered the passage of Director’s Liability Act in the UK.
As late as 1931, the Court of Appeals of New York held that negligence was reserved for
contractual relations between the defendant and the plaintiff, or required at least a duty on the part
of the defendant “to act with the same care that would have been due under a contract of
employment” (at p. 179). For fraudulent action it was not sufficient.150
In part, the problem of underenforcement that resulted from the incompleteness of law was
mitigated by the fact that stock exchanges assumed extensive proactive law enforcement powers.
In the U.S., the New York Stock Exchange soon emerged as the dominant stock exchange. It was
formally established in 1817 as a corporation. The original constitutive acts regulated members
and traders. As early as 1853 did the exchange stipulate requirements for companies that wished
to be listed on the exchange.151 They had to provide complete statements of shares outstanding
and capital resources. In 1869 a rule was introduced that required all shares to be registered with a
bank or other appropriate institution. In 1895 NYSE recommended, but not mandated, that all
companies submitted annual reports with income statements and balance sheets. In 1923 it
established a fraud bureau and in 1926 tightened listing requirements, encouraging companies to
give equal voting rights to shareholders.
                                                
149 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
150 The case Ultramares Corp. vs. Touche concerned the question whether an accounting firm
should be held liable for certifying accounts that had been forged. While it was ruled out that the
accountants positively knew about the fraudulent action, it was equally clear that they had made
no attempt to verify changes in the books that were included by hand after the books had already
been closed. The same court had ruled earlier that in product liability cases negligent conduct
might suffice for liability. Yet, it felt compelled to distinguish those cases where “what is released
or set in motion is a physical force” from cases where only “words, written or oral” will be
released to third parties. In other words, although the accountants were clearly negligent, and
knew that their reports would be transmitted to third parties, such as creditors, since they did not
have a direct contractual relationship with those creditors, they should not be held liable for
negligence. “Negligence alone is not a substitute for fraud” (p. 29). This principle limited liability
for misrepresentation of information more generally, including the issuance of securities.
151 Compare this with the LSE, which began to play a role as proactive law enforcer only at the end of the
19th century. For a more detailed comparison of NYSE and LSE, see Coffee (2001), at note [].
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These attempts to develop a set of rules and proactive enforcement devices aimed at
protecting shareholders could protect only investors of companies listed on that exchange.
Realizing the limits of its own regulation as well as the competition from other exchanges, NYSE
supported the enactment of the federal securities regulations in 1933/34.152 Since then it has
focused its efforts on continuous disclosure rather than the initial offering of shares, which is
covered by the SA registration requirements.
From the vantage point of the theory of incomplete law, the most important contribution of
the1933/34 securities regulations was the creation of regulator (the SEC) that combined ex ante
rule making with proactive enforcement powers, including the right to monitor, investigate,
enjoin actions, and impose fines or seek sanctions by the courts.
Individual states had addressed the problem of stock fraud for over two decades already. By
1933, 39 states had adopted so called “blue sky laws”, which encompassed regulations for
persons or entities wishing to sell securities to their residents. 153  Most states introduced
registration requirements for securities that were issued and/or traded within its jurisdiction
allowing them to screen issuers and enforce the law proactively through entry requirements.
Thirty-seven of the thirty-nine states also revised and extended their antifraud provisions. The
most sweeping definition of fraudulent behavior can be found in New York’s Martin Act of 1921
(§352).154
Federal regulators faced the choice among different regulatory philosophies.155 One was to
follow the New York example and rely primarily on reactive enforcement of anti-fraud
provisions. The other was to expand proactive law enforcement, which was the choice they
                                                
152 Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. Corp.
L. 1 (1983) PAGE
153 Louis Loss & Edward M. Cowett, Blue Sky Law, (1958) at p. []
154 Essentially, any action that had the appearance of fiction, deception or fraud could trigger intervention
by the Attorney General. He could investigate, subpoena witnesses and require the submission of books and
paper. Failure to comply with a subpoena was deemed a misdemeanor. In addition, the Attorney General
had the right to enjoin either a violation of the act or the sale of securities by the defendant in any capacity
within the state. Violation of any injunction could be penalized with a US$1000 fine.
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made.156  The core provision of the SA is that the distribution of any security is unlawful unless it
has been registered (Sec. 5) and unless it is accompanied by a prospectus that meets the
requirements further stipulated in the act. The definition of what constitutes a security under the
act is very comprehensive, listing what seems to be inexhaustible list of papers that are regarded a
security under the law.157 Registration is not equivalent with approval powers, which would be
the clearest form of proactive enforcement. Still, the SEC can use its powers to delay or even stop
the issuance of securities at the registration stage.
The SEC also exercises extensive residual lawmaking powers. While much of the literature
on securities regulation focuses on the SEC’s lawmaking powers, we regard this only as part of
the regulatory functions the SEC exercises. Much of the lawmaking powers could indeed be
exercised by the legislature, at least if it set up a special committee staffed with professionals with
expertise in financial markets. The case for a regulator in our framework rests on the combination
of proactive law enforcement with ex ante lawmaking powers, as enforcement activities allow the
SEC to get insights into market behavior, which then can be used to adapt regulation over time.
The residual lawmaking powers vested with the SEC allow it regularly make, amend, or
rescind those rules it deems necessary to carry out the provisions of the law “including rules and
                                                                                                                                                
155 Louis Loss, The Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (2001)
156 The 1933 Securities Act (SA) is concerned primarily with the initial distribution of securities. The
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), which had been established in 1914, was initially charged with
enforcing the SA. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), was established only by the Securities
Exchange Act (SEA) of 1934, an Act that addresses trading securities on the secondary market, i.e. with
continuous disclosure. The SEC today administers five other statues, the Trust Indenture Act (1939), the
Public Utility Holding Company Act (1935), the Investment Company Act (1940), the Investment Advisers
Act (1940), and the Securities Investor Protection Act (1970).
157 According to section 2 it means “any note, stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indeptedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, reorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any
interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a “security”, or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the
foregoing.”. Note, however, that since 1996 the SEC may exempt “any security” from the provisions of the
act.
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regulations governing registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities
and issuers, and defining accounting, technical and trade terms under this Act” (Sec. 19). In order
to ensure compliance with these rules and the provisions of the law, the SEC was vested with
proactive enforcement powers. In particular, the SEC may administer oaths, and affirmations,
subpoena witnesses, take evidence, demand the production of books, papers or other documents,
which it deems relevant or material to the inquiry. The proactive enforcement powers are
complemented with the right to initiate formal proceedings for a stop or refusal order and to
initiate court proceedings including preliminary injunctions to enjoin actions.158
This brief overview shows that the U.S. did not follow the English example in gradually
adapting liability rules, long before moving to a system of regulation. It almost seems as if the
U.S. at some point skipped this process of trial and error and immediately moved towards a
different enforcement system based primarily on proactive enforcement, when it became apparent
that harmful actions could result in substantial negative externalities.159 But trial and error did
take place in the U.S. The states’ experimentation with blue sky laws and the history New York
Stock exchange offered important insights into the benefits of a system that offered not only
reactive, but also proactive enforcement. The timing and scope of the regulatory regime for
financial markets established in 1933 was, undoubtedly, influenced by political factors. However
the fact that first stock exchanges and later state legislators recognized the need for a different
allocation of residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers suggests that other than political
factors supported the emergence of regulatory functions.
                                                
158 See Arts. 8 and 17 SA. In the words of Loss, these provision make “it possible to nip certain types of
fraud in the bud rather than to rely exclusively on criminal prosecution after the deed” Louis Loss, The
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation, (2001) at p [].
159 Note that there is still a substantial debate about the causal relation between stock fraud and the market
crash of 1929. See Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 The Yale Law Journal 2359 (1998) for a recent summary of this debate.
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2. Germany
We can observe a similar process in other countries as well. Germany is typically
characterized as “late developer”160 when it comes to the process of industrialization. As a “late
developer” Germany can be said to have benefited from developments in other countries. Yet,
this seeming advantage also preempted the experimentation and flexibility in lawmaking that
could be observed in England.
 As in other countries, the early development of securities markets and the law governing
corporations and securities in Germany was closely related to railway construction in the mid 19th
century. In 1838, Prussia enacted a law on railway companies followed in 1843 by a corporate
law. The law sought to prevent speculative bubbles of the kind that England experienced during
the railway mania by upholding the requirement of state approval for the establishment of
companies with limited liability (concession system).161 Thus, the lesson from England was to
seek to control the formation of capital markets, not to encourage it. However, an increasing
number of lawsuits suggested that the law was not very effective in preventing company fraud
and thus protecting investors. Where fraud did occur, investors had recourse to general principles
of contract or tort law that had been codified in regional codes (Saxony, Prussia), or could be
derived from the ius commune.162 As elsewhere, this law was not very effective in addressing the
problem of misrepresentation of information. Judges and legal scholars agreed that the
publication of a prospectus that included wrongful information alone was not sufficient to
                                                
160 Alexander Gerschenkron, Econmic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Alexander Gerschenkron 5
(1962). Indeed, the dominance of banks over equity markets has been explained by pointing out
that the desire to catch up with the leading industrial power, England, warrented other strategies
to accumulate capital within a much shorter period of time. For a critical assessment of the role of
banks in early industrialization in Germany, see, however, Jeremy Edwards & Sheilagh Ogilvie,
Universal Banks and German Industrialization: A Reappraisal, XLIX Economic History Review
427 (1996).
161 Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Die Aktiengesellschaft und das Aktienrecht von den Anfängen bis
1945, 1 Aktiengesetz Großkommentar Klaus J. Hop & Herbert Wiedemann Vol. 1, Rn. 13 (1992).
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establish liability. They reasoned that the prospectus created only a demonstratio, a general
notification addressed at potential investors about the emission of securities to finance a particular
undertaking, but was not a binding agreement. 163
The Lucca-Pistoja case of 1861, a landmark case on misrepresentation of information in
prospectuses, demonstrated the limits of contract and tort law to deal with the challenges of
securities market development. The case is similar to many of the English cases discussed above.
The undisputed facts that can be discerned from the series of lawsuits that were filed in
relation to this incident are as follows: Goldschmidt Bank in Frankfurt published an invitation for
acquisition of bonds in a company that was constructing a railway track from Lucca to Pistoja
(Italy). According to the invitation, the operating company had obtained approval from the
government of Toscany to issue bonds worth 5.25 Million Lira, 3 Million of which had been
reserved for underwriting in Germany. The offer was immediately oversubscribed. After the
company constructing the railway had collapsed and it had transpired that the prospectus omitted
crucial information, investors who had lost their money sued Goldschmidt Bank.
Since the bank itself was not the issuer and had not acquired the bonds in its own name, it
could be held responsible only as an intermediary. According to the law, intermediaries were
liable only for intentional wrongdoing. The question courts needed to solve was whether under
the relevant Roman law doctrine (actio emti) intentional wrongdoing required only the
suppression of relevant information, or in addition to this the intent to cheat – which was
disputed. German courts held that liability for fraud required that the offender knew or reasonably
could have known that the information was wrongful – not unlike English case law prior to the
enactment of the Directors’ Liability Act in 1890. This interpretation was confirmed by the
Reichsgericht in 1886, and upheld in subsequent decisions.164
                                                                                                                                                
162 The ius commune are Roman law principles that were recognized as the general principles of law
throughout the continent and complemented local customs and codifications.
163 Heinz-Dieter Assmann, Prospekthaftung, (1985)
164 RGZ 39, 245 (247).
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The existing legal remedies for fraud were put to a new test when Germany liberalized its
corporate law in 1870 and allowed companies to freely register without a special concession
granted by the state. Shortly after this change, Germany experienced a major boom and
subsequent crash (1871-1873), which resulted in two legislative responses: The tightening of the
corporate code in 1884 and the passage of the Stock Exchange Law (Börsengesetz, hereinafter
SEL) of 1896. In combination, these statutes sought to establish comprehensive control over the
process of company formation and their listing on an exchange, as it was in these areas where
lawmakers identified the greatest problems.165 Unlike English or US legislation, the German
lawmaker responded by greatly restricting the use of the corporate form and by imposing
legislated restrictions on access to stock markets. It also place stock markets squarely under the
supervision of the state. Thus, Germany is an example of a legal system that responded to the
problem of under-enforcement by greatly expanding ex ante lawmaking, not by changing the law
enforcement apparatus. We argue that this was detrimental to the further development of stock
markets in Germany.
Under the SEL, stock exchanges, of which there were many scattered around the country,
were squarely put under state control by requiring that they were licensed by the regional state
authority.166 The law explicitly delegated important law enforcement powers to the exchanges.
Each stock exchange was required to establish an admission’s office to scrutinize companies prior
to being admitted to the exchange.167 The admission regulations themselves were drafted by the
Upper House of the Parliament, not the stock exchange. Thus, the legislature retained residual
                                                
165 The dissemination of shares outside these two processes was left unregulated by German law. As Max
Weber pointed out even prior to the passage of the 1896 law, this design created incentives to avoid the
official exchange. Max Weber, Die Ergebnisse der deutschen Boersenenquete (1894), 44
Zeitschrift für Handelsrecht 45 (1895).
166 Historically, exchanges emerged as autonomus undertakings. For a historical overview of the history of
stock exchanges in Germany, see Hanno Merkt, ZurEntwicklung des Deutschen Börsenrechts von den
Anfängen bis zum Zweiten Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz, Börsenreform - Eine ökonomische,
rechtsvergleichende und rechtspolitische Untersuchung Klaus J. Hopt, Bernd Rudolph et al. 15 (1997).
167 This office was staffed by the exchanges with representatives from major banks and large industrial
enterprises Heinz Bremer, Grundzüge des deutcshen und ausländischen Börsenrechts, (1969).
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lawmaking powers over this crucial area. The fact that the legislature retained lawmaking rights
over this area, seems to have retarded the evolution of listing standards as the rule making process
in the Upper House proved much more cumbersome than comparable rule making at LSE or
NYSE.
The SEL also included liability rules for misrepresentation of the prospectus. Responsible
parties were defined as those who published the prospectus or initiated its publication. In practice
this meant that banks, which acted as the main company promoters, were the most likely
defendants in liability suits. These provisions proved to be of little practical relevance. First, they
covered only the listing process, which companies could avoid by issuing shares outside the
exchange. Second, they did not tighten the liability requirements as the UK Directors’ Liability
Act of 1890 had done. Thus, only intent established liability.168 The German Supreme Court
clarified only in 1998 that gross negligence was sufficient. 169 Third, the provisions captured only
misrepresentation of information in the prospectus that was issued for the purpose of listing a
company on the exchange and did not cover the circulation of information for other reasons.170
Fourth, the defendant could choose to remedy the claim by taking back the security and repaying
the original sale’s price. Giving the defendant this choice implied that investors who had sold the
securities on the secondary market had preempted a lawsuit as they were unable to return the
security should the defendant choose rescission rather than compensation. This requirement was
justified by the need to limit the potential number of claimants and to ensure some certainty
(Rechtssicherheit) for the issuer of a prospectus. Finally, there were serious doubts as to whether
only the original acquirer of securities or also secondary buyers had a claim.
The German law has remained remarkably stable over the years. Political and economic
circumstances may not have been very conducive for the development of a vibrant stock market
                                                
168 This was in contrast to an earlier draft that had sought to establish the standard of diligence in ones own
affairs (diligentia quam in suis).
169 Michael Kort, Neuere Entwicklungen im Recht der Börsenprospekthafung (§§ 45 ff. BörsG)
und der Unternehmensberichtshaftung (§ 77 BörsG), 1999 Die Aktiengesellschaft 9 (1999)
76
for much of the 20th century. However, even in the post-war period a case could be made that the
legal infrastructure was not very supportive. The major tool to regulate financial markets was the
stock exchange law and the state sponsored listing requirements. Stock exchanges operated under
the supervision of regional governments. A federal securities regulator, the Bundesaufsichtsamt
für das Wertpapierwesen [Federal Supervisory Agency for Securities] (BAW) was established in
Germany only in 1994.171 Its enforcement powers have been quite limited when compared to the
US Securities and Exchange Commission, or even the English Financial Services Authority. Prior
to the enactment of the Law on Prospectuses in 1998, law making and law enforcement powers of
the BAWe were largely confined to insider trading. 172  Under the 1998 law, the BAW can impose
fines of up to DM 1 Mln on companies failing to issue a prospectus, or for including wrongful
information in the prospectus. However, it cannot enjoin actions or bring civil suits against a
wrongdoer. By implication, this is left to investors, whose rights remain ill-protected both by
substantive and procedural law.
3. Summary
The brief overview of financial market regulation in the U.S. and Germany demonstrates that
different legal systems have allocated residual lawmaking and law enforcement powers in
different ways. In the U.S., the SEC was given extensive lawmaking and law enforcement powers
under the 1933/34 legislation. Courts still play an important role in law enforcement of stock
fraud and related issues, perhaps even more so, because the SEC can bring action, or can be a
defendant in actions brought against decisions taken by the SEC, but many potentially harmful
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171 Wertpapierhandelsgesetz of 26 June 1994, BGBl. I, 1749.
172 Even with regards to insider trading, the law enforcement powers of the BAW were quite limited. They
included monitoring, including the right to request additional information from likely violators, and the
imposition of fines for failure to disclose relevant information. Investigations and punishment of share price
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actions never make it to the courts, because they were caught in midstream by the regulator. By
contrast, in Germany, the legislature for a long time retained residual lawmaking powers over
determining the contents of listing requirements. Reactive law enforcement by courts was not
very effective, because of the difficulty shareholders faced in demonstrating loss, causality and
intent or gross negligence. In addition, the limited lawmaking rights courts can exercise in a civil
law system may have prevented investors from making use of this enforcement mechanism more
aggressively. The stock exchanges developed into the most important proactive law enforcers,
given their power to refuse listings or to delist companies. However, the regulatory reach of the
exchange could be circumvented by placing shares outside the exchange. In fact, in the post war
era, the unofficial market has played a substantial role in German financial market development.
Law enforcement for these markets was left to the courts, which developed a remarkable set of
case of law in dealing with misrepresentation of information.173 In light of the problems we have
associated with purely reactive law enforcement in this area of the law, however, this reactive
form of law enforcement remained suboptimal.
V. Conclusion
In this paper we develop a theory of the incompleteness of law. We argue that law is
intrinsically incomplete. Because lawmakers are unable to foresee all future contingencies, they
cannot write complete law. We further conjecture that if law is incomplete, then it is impossible
to design punishment that will optimally deter violations of the law. In other words, law
enforcement that relies exclusively on deterrence combined with reactive law enforcement will be
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173 Liability for misrepresentation of information was based on liability for pre-contractual
obligations (culpa in contrahendo), a flexible interpretation as to when a contract was deemed to
have been concluded –, and the recognition of implied contractual obligations. These judge-made
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sub-optimal. Therefore, other means of lawmaking and law enforcement are required to achieve
optimal law enforcement. We suggest that proactive law enforcement combined with the right to
adapt rules flexibly over time can enhance law enforcement. Given that law is incomplete, perfect
deterrence is unachievable. The question therefore is, what the optimal solution is in a world of
only second best options.
We suggest that regulators are agencies that are vested with proactive law enforcement
and residual lawmaking powers. We explain the emergence of regulators as a response to the
problem of under-enforcement of highly incomplete law. Regulators perform functions that
distinguish them both from legislatures as lawmakers and from courts as holders of residual
lawmaking and reactive law enforcement powers. While the scope of their lawmaking rights is
limited, they are more flexible in adapting law over time than legislatures are. As proactive law
enforcers they can initiate actions and exercise enforcement rights where courts by design must
be passive and wait for others to bring action.
We apply this theory to the development of financial market regulation in England. We show
that even in England, a country with a well functioning court system and access to courts to
enforce investors’ rights, regulators increasingly assumed residual lawmaking and proactive law
enforcement powers. This development was spearheaded by self-regulatory bodies, the stock
exchanges – an important indicator that theories that regard the emergence of regulation primarily
as policy intervention fail to explain the whole story. Developing listing and disclosure
requirements was the stock exchanges’ response to the problem of under-enforcement of stock
frauds, which ultimately threatened their business of organizing a stock market. The limits of the
exchanges’ reach explains why state agents eventually took over. They can regulate not only
official exchanges, but also securities traded elsewhere. With the growth of unregulated markets,
this became ever more important.
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Comparisons with other jurisdictions, including Germany and the US lend support to this
argument. Germany has long focused on regulating exchanges, rather than the market for
securities – leaving the latter by default to case law. Only recently were legal changes introduced
that establish a more general regulatory framework. Still, the powers of the regulator have
remained rather limited when compared with the UK or US regimes. In the US, the New York
stock exchange also preceded state and federal regulation. The shift to a federal regulatory regime
as early as 1933 can be explained with the size of the preceding market crash, and perhaps also
with political conditions. But the important point is that political conditions may explain the
timing, but do not fully explain the rational for the development of a demand for regulatory
functions, which consist of flexible rule making and proactive law enforcement.
Our theory has focused on institutional design assuming that lawmaking and law
enforcement agents discussed – legislatures, courts, and regulators – are all welfare maximizers.
In future work we hope to integrate incentive problems and political concerns into our analysis.
We also expect to extend the analysis to other areas of the law as well as to other legal systems, in
particular to emerging markets.
